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Cohen: The Uncertainty of Sun Printing

THE UNCERTAINTY OF SUN PRINTING
George M. Cohen *
Judges march at times to pitiless conclusions under the prod of a remorseless logic
which is supposed to leave them no alternative. They deplore the sacrificial rite.
They perform it, none the less, with averted gaze, convinced as they plunge the
knife that they obey the bidding of their office. The victim is offered up to the gods
of jurisprudence. 1

INTRODUCTION
Sun Printing & Publishing Ass’n v. Remington Paper &
Power Co. 2 is Judge Benjamin Cardozo’s testament to the value of
certainty in business transactions and the law of contracts, a value
that elsewhere he deemed subordinate to the demands of justice. 3
Joined by four other judges, Cardozo famously refused to enforce an
agreement between two large companies for the purchase and sale of
paper because the parties left open for future agreement (after an
initial four-month period) not only the price term but also the

*Brokaw

Professor of Corporate Law, University of Virginia. I thank Leslie Ashbrook of the
UVA Law Library and Faith Pang for excellent research assistance and participants in the
Touro Law School conference on Benjamin N. Cardozo: Judge, Justice, Scholar for helpful
comments.
1 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 66 (1924).
2 139 N.E. 470 (N.Y. 1923).
3 See Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921). In that famous case, Cardozo
states:
Those who think more of symmetry and logic in the development of
legal rules than of practical adaptation to the attainment of a just result
will be troubled by a classification where the lines of division are so
wavering and blurred. Something, doubtless, may be said on the score
of consistency and certainty in favor of a stricter standard. The courts
have balanced such considerations against those of equity and fairness,
and found the latter to be the weightier. The decisions in this state
commit us to the liberal view, which is making its way, nowadays, in
jurisdictions slow to welcome it.
Id. at 891-92.
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duration of the price term. 4 Almost a century later, the case remains
a prominent example of the contract doctrine of “uncertainty” or
“indefiniteness,” under which courts decline to enforce contracts that
omit one or more material terms. The indefiniteness doctrine retains
its vitality in the courts, 5 and Sun Printing remains good law in New
York as well as a staple of contracts casebooks. 6 All that despite the
efforts of the Uniform Commercial Code 7 and the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts 8 to encourage courts to fill in gaps left by the
parties where possible, a practice for which Cardozo himself was
well-known, at least in other cases. The questions of why contracting
parties leave gaps in their contracts and what courts should do in
response has also in recent years attracted a significant amount of
academic interest. 9
Yet I have always found Sun Printing to be a very confusing
and frustrating opinion. Cardozo’s rhetoric and logic has a certain
force, as it always does, but something has always seemed somewhat
off in a sense not present in his other contract law cases. Many
commentators have pointed out a tension between Cardozo’s Sun
Printing opinion and his other contract opinions and have seen the
main puzzle to be how, if at all, his approaches in the different cases
can be reconciled. 10 But none of the prominent commentators who
have offered views on the case has succeeded in uncovering the nub
of the problem. This is perhaps not surprising, given that no one to
date has undertaken a thorough examination of the case and the
surrounding circumstances. Doing so only enhances frustration with
Cardozo’s opinion, but opens up an interesting and fresh perspective
on a number of aspects of the case. My conclusion is that Cardozo
mischaracterized and misunderstood the contract, that his opinion is
more likely to have increased uncertainty rather than alleviated it, and

4

Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 470.
See Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1641, 1643-44 (2003).
6 See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS 422 (4th ed. 2008); STEVEN J. BURTON,
PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 89 (3d ed. 2006); JOHN F. DAWSON, WILLIAM BURNETT
HARVEY, STANLEY D. HENDERSON, DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, CONTRACTS 376 (9th ed. 2008);
BRUCE FRIER & JAMES J. WHITE, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS 93 (3d ed. 2012).
7 U.C.C. §§ 2-204, 2-305.
8 Restatement (Second) Contracts § 33.
9 See, e.g., George S. Geis, An Embedded Options Theory of Indefinite Contracts, 90
MINN. L. REV. 1664, 1673-75 (2006).
10 See infra p. 124.
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that he may unwittingly have helped facilitate and perpetuate
anticompetitive activity in the newsprint paper industry.
I begin by detailing Cardozo’s opinion in the case, Judge
Crane’s dissent, and Cardozo’s subsequent thoughts about the case. I
then summarize the existing academic criticism of the case before
turning to an examination of the historical and economic context of
the contract. Finally, I use that understanding to offer a new critique
of Cardozo’s opinion.
I.

THE SUN PRINTING CASE
A. The Record

Before turning to Cardozo’s analysis of the case, it will be
helpful to consider the record as it would have appeared to him. On
August 5, 1921, the Sun Printing & Publishing Association filed a
complaint in New York state court alleging that the Remington Paper
& Power Company, Inc. had breached a contract with Sun Printing
for the delivery of newsprint paper.
The complaint includes the full contract, 11 which stated:
AGREEMENT.
IN CONSIDERATION of the mutual covenants and
agreements hereinafter set forth, REMINGTON PAPER & POWER
CO., INC., of Watertown, State of New York, hereinafter
called the Seller, agrees to sell and hereby does sell and THE
SUN PRINTING & PUBLISHING ASSO., of New York City, State
of New York, hereinafter called the Purchaser, agrees to buy
and pay for, and hereby does buy the following paper.
Tonnage.
Sixteen Thousand Tons rolls News Print, Basis 24x3632/500.
65% of the tonnage in rolls 73” in width.
15% of the tonnage in rolls 55” in width.
20% of the tonnage in rolls 36½” in width.
11 Complaint at 7-11, Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Remington Paper & Power Co., 139
N.E. 470 (N.Y. 1923) (No. 30495-1921) (italics added in the key paragraph in dispute)
[hereinafter “Complaint”].
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Shipments.
One thousand tons per month in herein specified
percentages of sizes during the months of September, 1919, to
December 1920, inclusive.
Consignee.
Sun Printing & Publishing Association, Pier 34, East
River, New York City.
Specifications.
The paper shall be of substantially the same average
quality as sample attached to this agreement and of
approximately the basis of weight as above named, without
reference to production basis.
Five per cent. (5%) over or under the contract basis of
weight, shall be considered good delivery.
Use by the PURCHASER of any paper delivered under this
contract, even though not in conformity to the standard, shall,
as to said paper, be a waiver of all claims.
Width of rolls are not to be changed excepting with the
consent of the SELLER.
Price and Delivery.
The price shall be as hereinafter provided per one hundred
(100) pounds actual gross weight of rolls on board cars at
mill, including paper and wrappers and paper or sulphite
cores.
Terms.
Payments shall be made in New York Exchange, net cash
on the 20th of each month for all paper shipped the previous
month.
Miscellaneous.
On request of the Seller the Purchaser will on the 16th and
last day of each month make settlement by Trade Acceptance
payable without interest on the due date of the account for all
shipments made during the previous fifteen day period.
The price agreed upon between the parties hereto for all
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paper shipped during the month of September, 1919, shall be
$3.73 ¾ per hundred pounds gross weight of rolls on board
cars at Mills.
The price agreed upon between the parties hereto for all
shipments made during the months of October, November and
December, 1919, shall be $4.00 per hundred pounds gross
weight of rolls on board cars at mills.
For the balance of the period of this agreement the price
of the paper and length of terms for which such price shall
apply shall be agreed upon by and between the parties hereto
fifteen days prior to the expiration of each period for which
the price and length of term thereof have been previously
agreed upon, said price in no event to be higher than the
contract price for news print charged by the Canadian Export
Paper Company to the large consumers, the seller to receive
the benefit of any differentials in freight rates.
It is understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the
tonnage specified herein is for use in the printing and
publication of the various editions of the Daily and Sunday
New York Sun, and any variation from this will be considered
a breach of contract.
Cores.
Cores may be returned to the SELLER, Norfolk, N.Y.,
freight prepaid, and upon receipt in good condition, the
SELLER will either remit in cash or credit the account of the
PURCHASER at ten cents per lineal foot for all cores received
in good condition. No allowance will be made for cores of
other shippers or for cores not used in shipments made by the
SELLER.
Claims.
No allowance shall be made for waste, damage or paper
left on cores. In case of claim of any nature applying on any
shipment of paper made under this contract, the SELLER shall
be notified immediately but no claim shall be allowed for
consequential damage.
Contingencies.
In case the SELLER shall be unable and fail at any time to
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make and supply, or the PURCHASER shall be unable and fail
to take and use said paper in consequence of strikes, fire,
explosion, lock-outs, combinations of workmen, flood,
drought, embargoes, war, the acts of God, the public enemy,
or any cause beyond the control of either party hereto, the
SELLER shall not be liable to the PURCHASER for failure to
supply such paper, nor shall the PURCHASER be liable to the
SELLER for failure to take such paper during the period of
such disability.
Cancellation.
If the PURCHASER shall fail to pay any amounts when due
under this contract, or fail to make settlements as provided
herein, the SELLER may, at its option, cancel this contract,
refuse to furnish any more paper thereunder, and declare the
obligations of the PURCHASER for all paper furnished
hereunder due forthwith, notwithstanding the terms hereof,
but the PURCHASER shall remain liable to the SELLER for all
loss and damage sustained by reason of such failure.
THIS AGREEMENT is executed in duplicate original and
shall be governed by the laws of the place of the legal
domicile of the SELLER.
REMINGTON PAPER & POWER CO., INC.,
By M.A. HANNA V.P.
THE SUN PRINTING & PUBLISHING ASSOCIATION,
By V.H. POLACHEK
Watertown, N.Y., Oct. 6th 1919.
The only other information the Complaint provides about the
contract was that it “was prepared by or on behalf of [Remington] by
filling in by typewriting blank spaces in a printed form of agreement
that [Remington] had caused to be printed in advance for use in the
conduct of its business.” 12
The Complaint then alleges that Remington delivered 4000
12

Id. at ¶ V.
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tons of newsprint between September 1919 and December 1919, and
Sun Printing paid for that newsprint, as required by the contract. 13
During that time, however, “the supply of newsprint paper such as
that referred to in said agreement became scarce within the city and
the state of New York and elsewhere in the United States and that the
market price of such newsprint paper . . . rose materially and
substantially.” 14 On December 5, 1919, Remington “repudiated and
abandoned” the contract, notifying Sun Printing that the agreement
was “not binding.” Remington did not deliver any newsprint to Sun
Printing after January 1, 1920. 15
According to the Complaint, Sun Printing responded to
Remington by demanding that Remington deliver to Sun Printing
“during each month of the year 1920 one thousand tons of newsprint
paper . . . at the contract price for newsprint charged by the Canadian
Export Paper Company to the large consumers, [Remington] to
receive the benefit of any differentials in freight rates.” 16 Sun
Printing repeated this same demand every month in 1920. 17 The
Complaint alleges that this contract price was “readily
ascertainable” 18 and that Sun Printing was “ready, able and willing to
pay” it. 19
Finally, the Complaint alleges that as a result of Remington’s
failure to perform the contract, Sun Printing incurred damages of
$1,510,000, comprised of $910,000 in “general” damages 20 and
$600,000 in “special” damages. 21 Although the Complaint does not
explain the calculation of “general” damages, it is likely based on the
difference between the Canadian Export Company contract price over
the 12-month period of 1920 and the higher market prices for
newsprint. 22 The grounds for the alleged “special” damages were
13

Id. at ¶ VI.
Id. at ¶ VII.
15 Id. at ¶ IX.
16 Complaint, supra note 11, at ¶ X.
17 Complaint, supra note 11, at ¶ XIII.
18 Complaint, supra note 11, at ¶ XI.
19 Complaint, supra note 11, at ¶ XII.
20 Complaint, supra note 11, at ¶ XV.
21 Complaint, supra note 11, at ¶ XVI.
22 See Complaint, supra note 11, at ¶ XIV (alleging that the market price was higher than
the Canadian Export Paper Company contract price at all times during 1920); see also
Complaint, supra note 11, at ¶ XVI (alleging that Sun Printing had to pay as much as $.1175
per pound ($11.75 per 100 pounds) for newsprint in the market). Sun Printing’s appellate
brief confirms that “general damages . . . should be measured by the difference between the
14
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that Sun Printing was not able to buy substitute newsprint on the
market in sufficient quantities to satisfy its publishing needs, and as a
result had to buy inferior quality newsprint, reduce the size of its
newspapers, and reject profitable advertising. 23
Remington responded to Sun Printing’s complaint with a
demurrer, alleging simply that the complaint did not state a cause of
action because the contract “does not specify a price to be paid by
[Sun Printing] for paper covered by the contract to be delivered after
January 1, 1920, but leaves the price to be fixed by future agreement,
and is void for want of mutuality.” 24 On December 5, 1921, Sun
Printing moved for judgment on the pleadings, which the trial court
denied without opinion on December 20, 1921, giving Sun Printing
leave to file an amended complaint. 25
Sun Printing then appealed to the Appellate Division, which
reversed (3-2), and issued a written opinion. 26 The Appellate
Division agreed with Sun Printing that the contract’s maximum price
provision effectively gave Sun Printing an “option” to pay the
Canadian Export Paper Company price after January 1, 1920, which
Sun Printing exercised by agreeing to pay this price. 27 The court
found that this price was definite and that Sun Printing had given
consideration for the option in the form of the price Sun Printing had
paid for the earlier deliveries of newsprint. 28 The court noted: “There
is no other part of the contract that is claimed to be indefinite.” 29
Lastly, the court added that Remington by its demurrer conceded that
the Canadian Export Paper Company price was ascertainable, and
that “the fact that the selling price may vary from month to month
does not affect the validity of the contract.” 30
Remington appealed to the New York Court of Appeals under
the certified question of whether the complaint stated sufficient facts
Canadian contract price” for each month and the “market price” during that month. Brief for
Respondent at 44, Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Remington Paper & Power Co., 139 N.E.
470 (N.Y. 1923) (No. 30495-1921) [hereinafter “Respondent’s Brief”].
23 Id. at 44-45.
24 Transcript of Record at 19, Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Remington Paper & Power
Co., 139 N.E. 470 (N.Y. 1923) (No. 30495-1921) [hereinafter “Record”].
25 Id. at 2-4.
26 Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Remington Paper & Power Co., 193 N.Y.S. 698 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1922).
27 Id. at 701.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 702.
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to constitute a cause of action. 31 In its Appellant’s Brief, Remington
argued against Sun Printing’s “option” theory, introducing for the
first time the point, which it made repeatedly, that the parties did not
intend an option because the contract required agreement not only on
price but also on “the length of terms for which such price shall
apply.” 32 Remington contended that the “Canadian Export price,
which respondent claims should apply, was, however, not a fixed
price but a price constantly changing from month to month and from
time to time with the fluctuations of the paper market indicated by the
allegations in the complaint.” 33 Moreover, Remington argued that
the determination of price duration was important to Remington “in
order that it might, in the fluctuating state of the market, be sure of
some definite time for which the price agreed upon would hold.”34
The Canadian Export Paper Company price would not solve this
problem, because the parties could agree to a time period for the price
during which the Canadian Export Paper Company price might
change. The contract price would match the Canadian Export Paper
Company price “in the event only that the agreement as to price
coincided with the Canadian Export price and the latter price did not
fluctuate during the period of the agreement.” 35
In its Respondent’s Brief, Sun Printing built on the option
argument that had succeeded in the Appellate Division. It argued that
31

Record, supra note 24, at 19.
Brief of Appellant at 4, Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Remington Paper & Power Co.,
139 N.E. 470 (N.Y. 1923) (No. 30495-1921) [hereinafter “Brief of Remington”]; see also id.
at 5 (arguing that Remington “did not give an option as to price . . . by an agreement which
provided that the price and the length of time such price should apply should be agreed upon
by the parties”); id. at 6 (“There is no mistaking the meaning and intention of the parties that
there should be future agreements as to prices to be charged for 1920 and as to periods
agreed prices should cover.”); id. at 7 (“There is no period fixed for which respondent shall
exercise its alleged option to buy in case of a failure to agree as to price and term, whether a
month, or a day, or the whole year, and no provision for notice of the exercise of such
option.”); id. at 14 (“Not only did the parties reserve the price for future agreement but also
left the length of time the price was to run to be decided.”).
33 Brief of Remington, supra note 32, at 10.
34 Brief of Remington, supra note 32, at 15.
35 Brief of Remington, supra note 32, at 16. Remington offered a hypothetical example in
which Sun Printing and Remington agreed to a price of $5 per 100 pounds for 3 months, but
the Canadian Export Paper Company lowered its price to $4 during that time. Remington
argued that the $5 price would prevail despite the drop in the Canadian Export Paper
Company price. On the other hand, if the Canadian Export Paper Company price was $4 at
the time the price term was agreed to and subsequently rose to $5 during the three-month
period, the contract price (in this case $4) would again prevail. Brief of Remington, supra
note 32, at 15.
32
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the “provision of the agreement fixing the maximum price to be
charged during 1920 was [Sun Printing’s] measure of protection in
respect of price,” 36 and that if it had not been given the protection of
the price maximum, it would not have made the contract with
Remington at all. 37 Instead, it would have contracted with the
Canadian Export Paper Company. 38 Remington’s approach rendered
the price maximum term Sun Printing had bargained for
meaningless. 39 Sun Printing added that whatever hardship the
changed market conditions created for Remington, “if such price
were not ruinous to the Canadian Company, it ought not to be
presumed that it would be ruinous to [Remington].” 40
With respect to the Canadian Export Paper Company contract
price, Sun Printing argued that it did not have to allege or prove that
this price did not vary, because even if the price
did vary from time to time during the year 1920, that
circumstance would not make the contract indefinite
or uncertain or incomplete, so long as . . . the price of
newsprint to be delivered under the contract . . .
during any given month could be fixed by reference to
an admittedly definite and well defined standard price
for that month, namely, ‘the contract price for
newsprint charged by the Canadian Export Paper
Company to the large consumers.’ 41
Once Sun Printing agreed to pay the Canadian Export Paper
Company price, the contract did not “require any further consent by
[Remington] either as to price or length of term.” 42 As Sun Printing
had alleged in its complaint, it demanded during every month of 1920
that Remington provide the contracted-for newsprint at the Canadian
Export Paper Company price. 43
In its Reply Brief, Remington argued that Sun Printing
“entirely ignores the point that length of term was as important as

36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

Brief of Remington, supra note 32, at 22.
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 22, at 11-12.
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 22, at 12, 21, 26.
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 22, at 25.
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 22, at 43.
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 22, at 17-18, 42.
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 22, at 29.
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 22, at 40-41.
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price and that both were to be agreed upon.” 44 Remington focused on
the phrase “said price” in the clause containing the maximum price
provision, arguing that “‘[s]aid price’ was not a fluctuating price,
varying from day to day, or week to week, or month to month, with
the Canadian [E]xport price, . . . but was a fixed price for a stated and
agreed term.” 45 Thus, as Remington had argued in its initial brief, the
price “was to remain as fixed for such term, irrespective of whether
the Canadian price went above or fell below it.” 46
B. Cardozo’s Opinion
Cardozo, joined by four other judges, reversed the Appellate
Division. 47
Cardozo opens the opinion with a brief and
straightforward summary of the facts as alleged by Sun Printing in its
complaint. 48 Cardozo presents us with a seller and a buyer of paper,
some contract terms agreed to by the parties, performance on both
sides for four months, and then notice by the seller to the buyer that
the contract was “imperfect” and that the seller “disclaimed” any
future obligations. 49 There are none of the rhetorical flights of fancy
found in the statement of facts in some of Cardozo’s other famous
opinions. 50 The language is plain and workmanlike. The message is
clear: this case is a standard one for which ordinary legal principles
suffice.
If Cardozo’s factual presentation is spare, his legal analysis,
though typically concise, is quite complex and worthy of careful
examination. Cardozo begins by accepting the framing of
Remington’s counsel in its brief that the contract left two terms for
44 Reply Brief for Appellant at 4, Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Remington Paper &
Power Co., 139 N.E. 470 (N.Y. 1923) (No. 30495-1921).
45 Id. at 6.
46 Id. at 7.
47 Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 472.
48 Id. at 470.
49 Id.
50 See, e.g., Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917), which
famously opens with:
The defendant styles herself a ‘creator of fashions.’ Her favor helps a
sale. Manufacturers of dresses, millinery and like articles are glad to pay
for a certificate of her approval. The things which she designs, fabric,
parasols and what not, have a new value in the public mind when issued
in her name. She employed the plaintiff to help her to turn this vogue
into money.
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the parties to negotiate beginning in December 1919: the price and
the duration of that price. He then suggests that if the parties had
omitted only the price term, he might have been willing to endorse
Sun Printing’s legal theory, and enforce the contract as one giving the
buyer an “option” to pay the maximum Canadian Export Paper
Company price referenced in the contract for the remainder of the
contract term. 51 Omitting the price duration term, however, was too
much, especially because the contract expressly stated that the
“length of terms for which such price shall apply shall be agreed
upon by and between the parties,” 52 and did not provide for a
maximum (or minimum) price duration. Thus, reasons Cardozo,
giving the buyer an option to choose to pay the maximum price “does
not dispense with the necessity for agreement in respect of the term
during which the price is to apply.” 53
51 Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 470. Cardozo here cites one of his earlier opinions, Cohen &
Sons v. Lurie Woolen Co., 133 N.E. 370 (N.Y. 1921). In that case, the buyer agreed to buy a
fixed quantity of cloth at a stated price with the “privilege . . . to confirm more” if the seller
could get more. After the seller delivered the fixed quantity agreed to, the buyer, “exercising
its option,” demanded as much more of the cloth as the seller could procure. The seller
delivered a small amount more but much less than it had in fact procured. Cardozo held that
the buyer could enforce the contract and rejected a claim of indefiniteness, because the
contract gave the buyer the right to “fix the quantity, subject only to the proviso that the
quantity shall be limited by ability to supply.” Id. at 370-71. In rejecting the indefiniteness
claim, Cardozo stated:
The [seller], then, is bound, unless its promise is to be ignored as
meaningless. Rejection on that ground is at best a last resort. . . .
Indefiniteness must reach the point where construction becomes futile.
Uncertainties, thought to be impenetrable, are suggested [by the seller] in
respect of subject matter, time, and price. They will be found to be
unreal. It is said that we cannot tell whether the buyer, in exercising the
option, must make demand for all the seller can supply, or is free to call
for less. We think the implication plain that the buyer is to fix the
quantity, subject only to the proviso that quantity shall be limited by
ability to supply. It is said the option does not state the time within
which election is to be announced. We think a reasonable time is a term
implied by law. . . . It is said that the option does not embody a statement
of the price. We think a ‘privilege to confirm more’ imports a privilege
to confirm at the price of the initial quantity. This option was drawn by
merchants. We are persuaded that merchants reading it would not be
doubtful of its meaning. It was meant to accomplish something. We find
no such elements of vagueness as to justify the conclusion that in reality
it accomplished nothing.
Id. The intermediate appellate court in Sun Printing quoted this passage in support of its
decision upholding the contract. Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Remington Paper & Power
Co., 193 N.Y.S. 698, 701 (N.Y. App. Div. 1922).
52 Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 470.
53 Id. at 471.
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To Cardozo, the importance of the price duration term seems
to be a logical implication from the fact that a maximum price and a
price duration are different things. Cardozo states: “Agreement upon
a maximum payable this month or to-day is not the same as an
agreement that it shall continue to be payable next month or tomorrow.” 54 Thus, if the buyer agreed (exercised its “option”) to pay
the maximum for some stated duration, say one month, the buyer
would not be bound to that same maximum price (or a changed
maximum price) beyond that month. Next, following a line of
reasoning in Remington’s brief, Cardozo notes that if the parties had
agreed on an initial price duration, they would not have been obliged
to follow any change in the Canadian Export Paper Company price
that might occur during that period. That is, the contract price during
the agreed-upon duration would be fixed, and therefore would not
fluctuate with the Canadian Export Paper Company price, even if that
price changed during the relevant period. In Cardozo’s words, “the
standard was to be applied at the beginning of the successive terms,
but once applied was to be maintained until the term should have
expired.” 55 From these observations, Cardozo abruptly concludes
that in the absence of agreement on the duration of the price, “the
contract was inchoate.” 56 Why that conclusion follows is not
immediately obvious.
But Cardozo is just getting started. He next aims to rebut Sun
Printing’s argument that the price duration term was not material
because the buyer continued to exercise its option at the maximum
(Canadian Export Paper Company) price for the remainder of the
contract. Or as Cardozo puts the argument, “there was no need of an
agreement as to time unless the price to be paid was lower than the
maximum.”57 Cardozo gives several responses to this argument.
First, and most simply, he says that there is “no evidence of this
intention in the language of the contract.” 58
54

Id.
Id.
56 Id.
57 Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 471.
58 Id. What Cardozo means by “this intention” is not clear. The argument that the price
duration did not matter so long as Sun Printing chose the Canadian Export Paper Company
maximum price is based on an implication from the structure of the contract. A structural
interpretation argument finds “evidence” of the parties’ “intention” in the language of the
contract and inferences that can reasonably be drawn from such language. What Cardozo
seems to mean is that there is no evidence based on the contract’s language that the parties
55
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Second, and more crucially, Cardozo contends that
Remington would not likely have agreed to the option view of the
contract because under that interpretation, Remington “would never
know where it stood.” 59 That would be so in part because Sun
Printing, as it conceded, “was under no duty to accept the Canadian
standard,” 60 meaning that Sun Printing would have been able to
abandon the contract at any time the price was to be renegotiated
(even though Sun Printing in fact never expressed any such intention
throughout the duration of the contract). Cardozo continues:
Without an agreement as to time, however, there
would be not one option, but a dozen. The Canadian
price to-day might be less than the Canadian price tomorrow. Election by the buyer to proceed with
performance at the price prevailing in one month
would not bind it to proceed at the price prevailing in
another. Successive options to be exercised every
month would thus be read into the contract. Nothing in
the wording discloses the intention of the seller to
place itself to that extent at the mercy of the buyer. 61
Cardozo then acknowledges that an alternative interpretation
of the option theory would be that if the parties could not agree in
December 1919 on the price and price duration, Sun Printing was
entitled to exercise the option to pay the Canadian Export Paper
Company price only once, but then was bound to pay whatever that
price happened to be for the remainder of the contract. But even in
that case, says Cardozo, “the difficulty would not be ended.” 62 The
“difficulty” Cardozo identifies is that although “[m]arket prices in
1920 happened to rise,” 63 they might have fallen. In the falling
market price scenario, the “seller’s position” would be adversely
affected because, in the absence of an agreement about price

intended that the buyer would be able to enforce the contract by continually agreeing to pay
the maximum price. It is true that the contract does not expressly permit the buyer to do that,
but neither does it expressly state an intention that the seller could abandon the contract in
the face of the buyer’s willingness to pay the maximum price for the remainder of the
contract.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 471.
63 Id.
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duration, “the maximum would be lowered from one shipment to
another with every reduction of the standard,” 64 resulting in
decreasing payments to the seller over time. That is, Cardozo
interprets a one-time execution of the option to mean that Sun
Printing would agree in December 1919 to pay whatever the
Canadian Export Paper Company (and hence, Cardozo apparently
assumes, market) price turned out to be at each remaining month of
the contract (presumably 15 days before the beginning of each
month). If that price fell over time, Remington would make less and
less money over the course of the year. 65 Cardozo’s overall point is
that under either the multiple option or single option theory, the
contract would lack the “stability and certainty” that would come
from an agreement on the duration of the revised price.
Having dispensed with the option theory on the grounds that it
would place Remington at Sun Printing’s mercy and deprive
Remington of the stability and certainty to which it was apparently
entitled, Cardozo next rejects enforcing the contract based either on
the parties’ reasons for leaving out the price duration term or on the
seller’s motives in refusing to agree to one once the express price
term expired. Cardozo thought that the reason for the parties’
omitting the price duration term was irrelevant. Cardozo speculates
that the parties might have deliberately left the price duration term for
subsequent negotiation and agreement because they believed that the
“contingency” of failing to reach agreement later was “remote.” 66 To
Cardozo, however, whatever reason the parties may have had for
failing to fill the gap (“whether through design or through
inadvertence”) did not matter because the parties had merely made an
“agreement to agree,” which a court could not enforce. 67 With
64

Id.
Id. at 470-71. This interpretation seems to be in some tension with Cardozo’s earlier
point that the maximum price at which the buyer exercised its option was to be fixed during
the relevant period, and so any fluctuation in that maximum would not matter. Cardozo
avoids the inconsistency, however, by assuming that the relevant (default) duration of the
price resulting from the one-time exercise of the option would not be the remaining term of
the contract, but rather one month, the period specified in the Sun Printing-Remington
contract for each delivery and payment. Essentially, the argument recalls Cardozo’s initial
statement that agreeing to the maximum for one month is not the same as agreeing to the
maximum for subsequent months.
66 Id. at 471.
67 Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 471. For the proposition that agreements to agree are not
enforceable, Cardozo cites a New York Court of Appeals case also involving a contract for
newsprint and decided several months earlier, St. Regis Paper Co. v. Hubbs & Hastings
65
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respect to the seller’s motives, Cardozo says that if the contract is
unenforceable due to indefiniteness, the party disadvantaged by
performance of the contract has a “legal right” to abandon it. 68 That
right, Cardozo contends, “is not affected by our appraisal of the
motive.” 69
Paper Co., 138 N.E. 495 (1923). In fact, the Court of Appeals’ opinion in St. Regis was
issued between the date Sun Printing submitted its brief and the date of Remington’s Reply
Brief, which cited the opinion as supportive of Remington’s position. In St. Regis, the parties
agreed to a fixed price for the first three months of a two-year contract. After that, the
contract stated that the:
price for the balance of the year to be fixed by mutual consent. In the
event that the parties to this agreement shall fail to arrange a price for
any quarter before the expiration of the preceding three months, this
contract, in so far as it pertains to delivery over the unexpired period
shall terminate.
St. Regis Paper Co., 138 N.E. at 496. Because the contract in St. Regis expressly stated that
it would “terminate” if the parties failed to reach agreement on price, the case was arguably
distinguishable from Sun Printing, whose contract contained no such clause, but Cardozo
does not note the distinction. On the other hand, there were other New York cases refusing
to enforce indefinite contracts that Cardozo could have cited (some of which he does cite
elsewhere in the opinion) in which the contract did not expressly state what the parties
wanted to happen if they could not reach agreement on the open term.
68 Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 471. Cardozo again cites St. Regis in support. After setting
forth the proposition that an agreement to agree is not enforceable, St. Regis does state that
the seller “exercised its legal right in refusing to be bound thereby.” St. Regis Paper Co., 138
N.E. at 497.
69
Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 471. For the proposition that the motives of the party
seeking to avoid an indefinite contract are immaterial, Cardozo cites an older (pre-Cardozo)
New York Court of Appeals case, Mayer v. McCreery, 23 N.E. 1045 (1890). In that case, a
building owner accepted a proposal from a prospective tenant stating that the tenant would
“take your building, 483 Fifth avenue, on a twenty-one years’ lease from May 1, 1885, to be
altered by you similar to one Hume & Co. is now altering, and floors, etc., arranged as
spoken about, etc., at the yearly rent of $5,250 for each year of the term, net rent, no taxes,
assessments, etc. Plans, etc., to be mutually agreed upon.” Id. at 1045. The court held that the
statement that the plans were “to be mutually agreed upon” rendered the contract indefinite
and unenforceable. With respect to the landlord’s motive, the court stated:
The motives of the defendant for his refusal are wholly immaterial;
whether they were because he thought he could make a more favorable
agreement with some other person, or because he thought there was
some difficulty in the deeds upon which he held title, which prevented
him from leasing the premises for the purposes intended, is a matter of
no importance.
Id. at 1046. An alternative approach that one might have thought Cardozo would endorse
would be that the landlord’s motive could suggest that the lack of specification of the
“plans” was not material given that they were apparently to be “similar” to the alterations
being done on another building. Cf. Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 890-92 (N.Y.
1921) (holding that a builder’s failure to use “Reading” pipe in a house was not a condition
on the owner’s making the final payment in part because there was no material difference in
the pipe that was installed and suggesting that the owner’s conduct in failing to inspect the
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At this point, Cardozo offers his strongest and most general
statement against contractual gap-filling by courts. He rejects the
suggestion that the court could force the seller
to accept a term that would be reasonable in view of
the nature of the transaction and the practice of the
business. To hold it to such a standard is to make the
contract over. The defendant reserved the privilege of
doing its business in its own way, and did not
undertake to conform to the practice and beliefs of
others. 70
pipe upon arrival, delaying in notifying the builder of the defect, and insisting that even
covered up pipe be removed supported the finding of immateriality); see also George M.
Cohen, The Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 941,
990-92 (1992).
70 Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 471. Cardozo here cites United Press v. New York Press Co.,
58 N.E. 527 (1900), another pre-Cardozo indefiniteness case, which was the basis on which
two judges dissented in the Appellate Division, Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Remington
Paper & Power Co., 193 N.Y.S. 698, 702 (N.Y. App. Div. 1922), and which both parties
discussed in their briefs. In that case, United Press agreed to supply its “nightly report” to
New York Press for a price “not exceeding three hundred dollars during each and every
week that said news report is received” 1892 to 1900. United Press, 58 N.E. at 527. New
York Press performed for two years and then informed United Press that it would no longer
take the report because it needed to cut costs. The parties attempted to negotiate a new price
but could not come to an agreement. On the page cited by Cardozo, the court states:
The effect upon the instrument of its indefiniteness, or uncertainty, as to
the price to be paid, was to make it operative only so long as the parties
chose, and were able, to agree upon the price per week. In other words,
whether it should have contractual force, would depend upon the
subsequent agreement of the parties and, manifestly, if anything
remained to be done by them, relating to the subject-matter of the
contract, it was an incomplete and unenforceable instrument. The
payment of $300 each week in the past, for the news report furnished,
was not an acknowledgment of an obligation to pay that amount during
the whole contemplated life of the contract. . . . It is evident that the
parties recognized their contract to be uncertain, or indefinite, as to the
price, from their correspondence and the efforts to come to a mutual
understanding and agreement upon the subject.
Id. at 529. The statement does not support Cardozo’s contention that the court should not
require contracting parties to “conform to the practice and beliefs of others,” a kind of trade
usage argument. Instead, United Press rejects a course of performance argument for
resolving indefiniteness, and infers from the parties’ failed attempts at renegotiation an
intention not to be bound if they could not agree on a new price. Id. Neither situation was
present in Sun Printing. United Press is also distinguishable from Sun Printing because in
United Press, the buyer was seeking to escape from a contract with a price maximum,
whereas in Sun Printing, it was the seller who was trying to escape from a contract with a
price maximum, a point conceded by Remington in its brief. See Brief of Remington, supra
note 32, at 11. Thus, the “option” argument was not available in United Press because the
“wrong” party was seeking to escape the contract. The intermediate appellate court in Sun
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This statement seems to endorse a textualist approach to
interpretation as best reflecting the parties’ intentions. Reiterating
this point, Cardozo next rejects a specific “reasonable term” – a
monthly price duration – as inconsistent with the language of the
contract, which states that the price term is “to expire at such
intervals as the agreement may prescribe.” 71 Cardozo then notes that
the parties could have, “with little change of language,” 72 written a
definitive term, but they did not. He then triumphantly concludes the
paragraph with the opinion’s most memorable line: “We are not at
liberty to revise while professing to construe.” 73 Classic Cardozo.
The remaining two paragraphs of the opinion respond to two
additional arguments. First, Cardozo returns to the question of the
nature of the Canadian Export Paper Company price maximum. This
time, Cardozo considers a suggestion by the dissent that this price
might have stayed constant throughout 1920, thus rendering
irrelevant the concerns Cardozo had expressed earlier in the opinion
about a fluctuating maximum price, and rendering the price duration
term immaterial. Cardozo answers that it was up to Sun Printing as
the plaintiff to allege that the Canadian Export Paper Company price
was fixed for the remaining twelve months of the contract, but Sun
Printing had not done so either in its complaint, or in its brief, or at
oral argument. In fact, Cardozo notes, Sun Printing’s conduct in
coming back to Remington each month to demand delivery at the
Printing distinguished United Press on the ground that in that case there was no
consideration given for an option, whereas there was consideration in Sun Printing based on
the definite price stated for the first four months. Sun Printing, 193 N.Y.S. at 701.
71 Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 471. Here Cardozo takes a small but significant liberty with
the facts. He ignores the mandatory nature of the language in the contract (the future price
and price duration “shall be agreed upon”) by stating that the contract states that the prices
“are to expire at such intervals as the agreement may prescribe.” Cardozo repeats this
mischaracterization in his description of the case in The Growth of the Law. CARDOZO, supra
note 1, at 109 (stating that the price was to continue “for such a time, as buyer and seller
might agree”) (emphasis added). It is true, however, that in the traditional interpretation of
the “agreement to agree” rule, the difference between “shall” and “may” or “might” does not
matter. In The Growth of the Law, Cardozo also allows himself a slight exaggeration
concerning the facts of Sun Printing when he describes the contract as involving a “stated
term of years,” rather than the actual contract duration of sixteen months. CARDOZO,
GROWTH OF THE LAW, supra note 1, at 109.
72 Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 471.
73 Id. Cardozo was fond enough of this aphorism that he quoted it in an opinion he wrote
later that year in support of a literal interpretation of an insurance contract provision.
Goldstein v. Standard Accident Ins., 140 N.E. 235, 237 (N.Y. 1923). Several years later,
however, Cardozo dissented from an opinion in which the majority quoted the line. Graf v.
Hope Bldg. Corp., 171 N.E. 884, 885 (N.Y. 1930).
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maximum price then prevailing suggested that Sun Printing thought
the maximum price was likely to fluctuate from month to month. 74
Lastly, Cardozo raises the possibility that if Sun Printing,
having agreed to pay the maximum price, had also allowed
Remington to choose whatever price duration Remington wanted,
and Remington had then refused to continue with the contract, the
court might have found a breach by Remington. Cardozo says the
court need not resolve whether or not this theory of liability is
tenable, because Sun Printing did not take that position. “Instead, it
gave its own construction to the contract, fixed for itself the length of
the successive terms, and thereby coupled its demand with a
condition which there was no duty to accept.” 75
C. Judge Crane’s Dissent
Whereas Cardozo opens his opinion by focusing on the nature
of the missing terms, Judge Crane begins his dissent by stressing the
parties’ intentions concerning the contract as a whole. He states:
“The parties to this transaction beyond question thought they were
making a contract for the purchase and sale of 16,000 tons rolls news
print.” 76 In the next sentence, Crane flips Cardozo’s concern that the
contract (under the option interpretation) placed the seller at the
mercy of the buyer to contend, instead, that allowing the seller to
escape the contract would establish a means for the seller to take
unfair advantage of the buyer. As Crane puts it, based on an
allegation in the Complaint: “The contract was upon a form used by
74

Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 471-72.
Id. at 472. Here Cardozo gives his last case citation, to one of his early opinions,
Rubber Trading Co. v. Manhattan Rubber Mfg. Co., 116 N.E 789 (N.Y. 1917). In Rubber
Trading, Cardozo held that the seller of rubber, in tendering the rubber to the buyer, imposed
a condition that the buyer had to stipulate that the rubber was of satisfactory quality before
the seller would complete delivery. The court found that this condition was not stated in or
implied by the contract and therefore the buyer was permitted to respond by rejecting the
rubber without consequence. Rubber Trading Co., 116 N.E. at 889. Cardozo’s point in
citing Rubber Trading seems to be that the buyer in Sun Printing did not merely state its
willingness to pay the maximum price, which the contract permitted, but in addition
conditioned this willingness on the seller’s acquiescence in a monthly price duration term,
which the contract did not permit. In his statement of the facts, however, Cardozo does not
indicate that the buyer conditioned its demand to get the paper at the maximum price on the
seller’s acceptance of a monthly price term. Rather, Cardozo simply states that the buyer
renewed its demand each month, with no response from the seller. Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at
470.
76 Id. at 472 (Crane, J., dissenting).
75
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the defendant in its business, and we must suppose that it was
intended to be what it states to be, and not a trick or device to defraud
merchants.” 77
After providing more detail about the terms of the contract
than Cardozo offers, Crane expands on his initial points:
Surely these parties must have had in mind that some
binding agreement was made for the sale and delivery
of 16,000 tons rolls of paper, and that the instrument
contained all the elements necessary to make a binding
contract. It is a strain upon reason to imagine the paper
house, the Remington Paper & Power Company,
Incorporated, and the Sun Printing & Publishing
Association, formally executing a contract drawn up
upon the defendant’s prepared form which was useless
and amounted to nothing. We must, at least, start the
examination of this agreement by believing that these
intelligent parties intended to make a binding contract.
If this be so, the court should spell out a binding
contract, if it be possible. I not only think it possible,
but think the paper itself clearly states a contract
recognized under all the rules at law. 78
Crane’s reasoning is that these sophisticated businesses would not
have gone to such effort to write such a detailed and formally
executed document if they did not intend it to be enforceable. He
believes the court should support this intent rather than deny
enforcement to encourage the parties to write more definite contracts.
Crane then turns to the two open terms, starting with the price
term. In contrast to Cardozo’s tentative suggestion that if only the
price term had been left open the court might have been willing to fill
it in, Crane expresses no hesitation in concluding that if the buyer
was willing to pay the maximum price, the price term was
sufficiently definite to be enforced. In fact, Crane finds that this
conclusion “seems to be very clear.” 79 With respect to Cardozo’s
concern that the price duration term was left open, Crane responds
that “there are many answers to this.” 80
77
78
79
80

Id.
Id. at 472-73.
Id. at 473.
Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 473. (Crane, J., dissenting).
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Crane then proceeds to offer four possible ways of filling in
the gap, the first two of which are the ones Cardozo discusses in his
opinion, 81 and none of which had been suggested by Sun Printing in
its brief. First, the Canadian Export price on December 15th, 1919
could be the price for the remainder of the contract (the single option
theory). Crane here suggests that the Canadian Export Paper
Company price might have been stable for the entire year, a
conjecture Cardozo counters as not asserted or proven by the buyer.
Second, the price duration could be monthly, with the buyer able to
agree to pay the Canadian Export Paper Company price on the
fifteenth of each successive month. Cardozo parries this proposal
with his critique that it would create a “dozen options” and the seller
would “never know where it stood.” Crane’s third suggestion – and
one to which we will return in a subsequent section – is that the price
duration could be the price duration in the Canadian Export Paper
Company contracts. Cardozo ignores this suggestion except to the
extent it is implicitly covered by his critique of the multiple option
interpretation. Finally, Crane maintains that as a last resort, the court
should “apply the rule of reason and compel parties to contract in the
light of fair dealing” by determining a price duration period that “is
reasonable under all the circumstances and conditions as applied in
the paper trade.” 82 Cardozo implicitly responds to this suggestion
with his statement that the seller “did not undertake to conform to the
practice and beliefs of others.”
Crane concludes his dissent by contending that any one of his
four solutions would lead to a “practical and just result”; therefore,
81 Before turning to the four possibilities, Crane for a third time reiterates: “We have
reason to believe that the parties supposed they were making a binding contract[; thus,] . . .
the court should be very reluctant to permit a defendant to avoid its contract.” Id. (Crane, J.,
dissenting). Interestingly, this statement of the parties’ intent and Crane’s confidence in
ascertaining it is more tentative than the first two statements, which asserted that the parties’
contractual intent was “beyond question” and something the parties must “surely . . . have
had in mind.” Id. at 472. In support of the last phrase quoted about the court’s reluctance to
permit contract avoidance, Crane cites the first case in his dissent, Wakeman v. Wheeler &
Wilson Mfg. Co., 4 N.E. 264 (N.Y. 1886). The citation is odd because Wakeman is a case
about whether damages are too uncertain to be awarded, not whether a contract’s terms are
too indefinite to be enforced, but one could argue the doctrines are analogous. Crane cited
Wakeman because of the following statement in that opinion: “A person violating his
contract should not be permitted entirely to escape liability because the amount of the
damages which he has caused is uncertain.” Wakeman, 4 N.E. at 266. More generally, it is
worth noting that Crane’s dissent does not cite any of the cases in Cardozo’s opinion; nor
does Cardozo cite any of the cases in the dissent.
82 Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 473 (Crane, J., dissenting).
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allowing the seller to “escape from its formal obligations” would
“give the sanction of law to a deliberate breach.” 83 In support, Crane
adds a string cite of three Cardozo opinions, including his wellknown opinion in Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 84 though none of
those cases involved a claim of indefiniteness or explicitly referenced
“deliberate breach.” 85
D. Remand and Cardozo’s Subsequent (But Not Second)
Thoughts
On remand, Sun Printing, the buyer, amended its complaint to
allege that the default price duration should be quarterly periods, a
solution not suggested by Judge Crane in his dissent. The trial court,
finding that the buyer’s allegation did not remove the contract’s
indefiniteness, dismissed the complaint. 86 This time, the Appellate
Division affirmed the trial court without opinion. 87 In response to a
subsequent motion for a leave to appeal, Cardozo initially wrote a
memorandum supporting the granting of the motion:
The amount involved is very large, over a million, five
83

Id.
118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
85 Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 473. Wood involved the granting of an exclusive agency to a
fashion promoter in an agreement that did not expressly impose any duties on the agent.
Cardozo held (with Crane dissenting, interestingly) that there was an implied obligation on
the part of the agent to exercise “reasonable efforts to bring profits and revenues into
existence.” Wood, 118 N.E. at 215. Unlike Sun Printing, Wood was argued on a theory of
lack of mutuality of obligation and consideration; that is, Lady Duff-Gordon argued that she
got nothing in return for her promise to Wood, the agent, because he made no return
promise. Although the Wood opinion says nothing about a “deliberate breach,” it does show
Cardozo’s willingness to read terms into contracts and to reject an outdated “formalism” in
which “every slip [is] fatal.” Id. at 214. In the second Cardozo case cited by Crane (and the
only one of the cases Crane cites that Sun Printing discussed in its brief), Moran v. Standard
Oil Co., 105 N.E. 217 (N.Y. 1914), Cardozo held that an employment contract under which
the employee agreed to sell paint on the employer’s behalf for five years on a commission
basis was not terminable by the employer at will, but rather implied an agreement to employ
the agent for five years. Cardozo expressed a hesitation to infer an intention to create “so
one-sided an agreement,” as the employer was contending for, especially when the document
was drafted by the employer’s lawyers, who could easily have drafted an express at will
termination provision. Id. at 220. Crane was not making any of these points; thus, his citation
is somewhat puzzling. The final case, United States Rubber Co. v. Silverstein, 128 N.E. 123
(N.Y. 1920) involved the interpretation of an ambiguously worded guaranty. Its relevance to
Sun Printing is not clear.
86 ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 323 (First Harvard Univ. Press paperback ed., 2000).
87 Sun Printing & Publishing Ass’n v. Remington Paper & Power Co., 206 N.Y.S. 966
(App. Div. 1924).
84
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hundred thousand dollars [the total amounts of
damages alleged by Sun Printing in its Complaint].
The defendant is trying to squirm out of a contract on
very technical grounds. We sustained its position,
though with avowed reluctance. If there is any
reasonable way of holding this complaint good, I am
sure we shall be glad to take advantage of it. 88
After receiving the seller’s brief, however, Cardozo changed
his mind, concluding that the chances of reversal were “negligible”
and recommending denial of the motion. 89 The other Court of
Appeals judges concurred in Cardozo’s assessment.
Around the same time, Cardozo revisited Sun Printing in The
Growth of the Law, based on lectures he gave at Yale Law School as
a sequel to The Nature of the Judicial Process, also based on lectures
he had given at Yale Law School several years earlier. Cardozo
opened his last lecture with a discussion of Sun Printing as a
counterbalance to case examples he had previously referenced that
“stress the worth of change, the virtue of flexibility, as contrasted
with the worth of certainty.” 90 To Cardozo, Sun Printing was a case
in which “certainty was founded to be the larger good when mobility
was weighed against it.” 91 Cardozo then revisited and elaborated on
some of the themes of his previously published opinion:
Here was a case where advantage had been taken of
the strict letter of a contract to avoid an onerous
engagement. Not inconceivably a sensitive conscience
would have rejected such an outlet of escape. We
thought this immaterial. The court subordinated the
equity of a particular situation to the overmastering
need of certainty in the transactions of commercial
life. The end to be attained in the development of the
88 KAUFMAN, supra note 86, at 323. The “avowed reluctance” is not evident in Cardozo’s
opinion, however.
89 KAUFMAN, supra note 86, at 323 (quoting from Report in Sun Printing, CM, Box 2,
Folder 2114 (motion 6, Jan. 19, 1925)).
90 CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 109. The quotation at the beginning of this article represents
Cardozo’s pro-flexibility views from one of the earlier lectures.
91 CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 109. After then summarizing the Sun Printing facts, Cardozo
adds a footnote stating that “a different result may be reached if the omitted term is of
subsidiary importance (1 Williston, Contracts, § 48), but ordinarily the price to be paid, if
reserved for subsequent agreement, is to be ranked as fundamental.” CARDOZO, supra note 1,
at 110 n.1.
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law of contract is the supremacy, not of some
hypothetical, imaginary will, apart from external
manifestations, but of will outwardly revealed in the
spoken or written word. The loss to business would in
the long run be greater than the gain if judges were
clothed with the power to revise as well as to interpret.
Perhaps, with a higher conception of business and its
needs, the time will come when even revision will be
permitted if it is revision in consonance with
established standards of fair dealing, but the time is
not yet. In this department of activity, the current
axiology still places stability and certainty in the
forefront of the virtues. 92
Thus, Cardozo had no misgivings about his earlier opinion.
II.

COMMENTARY ON SUN PRINTING

A number of commentators, including some of the most
prominent writers on contract law, have offered various critiques of
Sun Printing over the years since its appearance. A brief note on the
case published in the year it was decided rejects the option theory but
agrees with the dissent that the parties had agreed to make a binding
contract. 93 The note further argues that, given the monthly payment
period specified in the contract, the court should have implied the
Canadian Export Paper Company maximum price during the month
of each shipment of paper, thus endorsing one of Judge Crane’s
proposals. 94 Fifteen years later, Arthur Corbin, in an article on
Cardozo’s contracts cases, puzzled over Sun Printing in a footnote,
calling the decision “somewhat surprising[]” and speculating that
Cardozo may have been “less moved to cure defects in the work of
the well-paid lawyers of two rich corporations.” 95 Grant Gilmore
92

CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 110-11 (footnote omitted).
Case Note, Contracts – Construction – Agreements to Agree, 33 YALE L.J. 97, 98
(1923).
94 Id. (“Since shipments and payments were to be monthly, it seems that the adoption of
the maximum price charged by the Canadian Export Company during the month of shipment
offered a reasonable basis for giving operative effect to that intent. Nor does any substantial
reason appear for the court to refuse to apply to the determination of the period over which a
price is to operate the rule of reasonableness which is regularly applied to fix prices or times
for delivery.”).
95 Arthur Linton Corbin, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Contracts, 48 YALE L.J.
93
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cited Corbin’s criticism of Sun Printing in The Death of Contract,
and quipped that “Cardozo was not always a model of consistency.” 96
Judge Posner, in his book on Cardozo, notes Crane’s “powerful
dissent” and speculates that Cardozo may have had political (in the
broad sense) motivations for deciding Sun Printing the way he did.
According to Posner: “Cardozo wanted to be an institutional leader
and succeeded in this aim, in part, by avoiding the pose of an
ostentatious liberal.” 97
Larry DiMatteo has provided the most detailed critique of
Cardozo’s reasoning in Sun Printing, albeit in an article focused on
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon. 98 DiMatteo’s main point is that
Cardozo, who generally favored contextual analysis in contract cases
such as Wood, misapplied that analysis in Sun Printing. First,
DiMatteo notes that Cardozo was willing to consider some contextual
evidence in Sun Printing. Specifically, “Cardozo ventures outside
the contract to note that market prices were on the rise in 1920.”99
But, DiMatteo argues, Cardozo did not follow the implications of this
contextual evidence. He could have recognized that the rising market
prices explained why the buyer agreed to a price maximum set at the
“prime customer rate” and that if market prices rose higher than that
prime rate, “the possibility for exploitation existed.” 100 Instead,
426, 428 n.1 (1938); 52 HARV. L. REV. 408, 410 n.1 (1938); 39 COLUM. L. REV. 56, 58 n.1
(1938). Corbin contrasts Sun Printing with several other cases that in his view demonstrated
Cardozo’s “clear genius in his filling of gaps, his finding of promises by implication where
none was put into clear words, his discovery and enforcement of the directing purpose for
which a contract was made, not permitting that purpose to fail by reason of vagueness in
details.” 48 YALE L.J. at 427, 52 HARV. L. REV. at 409, 39 COLUM. L. REV. at 57. These
cases include Cohen & Sons, distinguished by Cardozo in his opinion, see supra note 51, and
Moran and Wood, cited by the dissent, see supra note 85.
96 GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 144 n.137 (Ronald K. L. Collins ed., 1998).
97 RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 121 (Univ. of Chicago ed.,
1990). Cardozo’s eagerness to provide a counterbalance to his general support of judicial
flexibility in The Growth of the Law. CARDOZO, supra note 1, provides some support for
Posner’s view.
98 Larry A. DiMatteo, Cardozo, Anti-Formalism, and the Fiction of Noninterventionism,
28 PACE L. REV. 315 (2008).
99 Id. at 338. Cardozo’s observation may go outside the contract, but it does not go
outside the record. Sun Printing noted the increase in prices in its complaint. See Complaint,
supra note 11. In paraphrasing Cardozo’s opinion on this point, DiMatteo takes a small, but
important, liberty. Cardozo says that market prices “happened to rise.” That suggests
Cardozo was looking at the matter solely from the ex post perspective of what actually
happened rather than what the parties expected ex ante at the time of contracting, which is
what DiMatteo is suggesting, as evidenced by his subsequent analysis. Nevertheless, I agree
with DiMatteo’s view for reasons discussed in the next section.
100 DiMatteo, supra note 98, at 338. DiMatteo does not explain what he means by the
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Cardozo turned to the disadvantage to the seller if market prices had
fallen, to which DiMatteo’s response is, “why is this a bad thing?” 101
Second, DiMatteo criticizes Cardozo’s argument that the
omission of a price duration term as well as a price term made the
contract nothing more than an “agreement to agree” as “strained
logic.” DiMatteo argues that Cardozo could have based the price
duration on the price durations for the first several months of the
contract (more of a structural argument than a contextual argument)
and found that the contract implied either a monthly or quarterly
price duration. 102 Lastly, DiMatteo attacks Cardozo’s refusal to read
into the contract a reasonable term as inconsistent with his ready use
of a “contextual inquiry into business practice” to impose a
reasonable efforts requirement in Wood. DiMatteo criticizes
Cardozo’s willingness to blame the buyer for unilaterally insisting on
the appropriate price duration term as
not a rational argument given the fact that the buyer
had set the new price at the maximum price allowed
by the contract, that the unexpired portion of the
contract was a modest twelve months, and that the
seller’s response to the buyer’s attempt to set the price
and duration of the price change was to reject any
obligation under the contract. 103
Despite his sharp criticism of Cardozo’s opinion, DiMatteo
(perhaps halfheartedly) nevertheless defends it on the basis of
Cardozo’s alternative rationale that the decision would “stimulate
certainty in legal rules and business transactions.” 104 According to
“possibility for exploitation,” but I assume he means that the seller would unreasonably try
to escape its contractual obligations, which in fact happened.
101 DiMatteo, supra note 98, at 338. DiMatteo does not consider the possibilities that a
market price decline might be a “bad thing” if it was not anticipated by the parties or if for
some reason the maximum fell below the seller’s production costs.
102 DiMatteo, supra note 98, at 338. DiMatteo adds that this interpretation would be
“especially reasonable given that a price source was accessible” and “the buyer was willing
to pay the maximum contract price as represented by that price source.” DiMatteo, supra
note 98, at 338-39. But DiMatteo does not explain how the “price source” would solve
Cardozo’s price duration concern. It may be that he is implicitly endorsing Judge Crane’s
suggestion that the applicable price duration could be the duration of the contracts of the
Canadian Export Paper Company, a suggestion I take up in the next section.
103 DiMatteo, supra note 98, at 339 (footnote omitted).
104 DiMatteo, supra note 98, at 340 (adding that, despite his attempt, “[i]t is difficult to
reconcile Cardozo’s opinion in Sun Printing with Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, and the cases
cited by Justice Crane. . . .”).
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DiMatteo: “Without some limits to the contextual manipulation of
material terms, parties would intentionally leave gaps in their
contracts,” which “would encourage speculation and exploitation in
future commercial transactions.” 105
Several other commentators have offered support for
Cardozo’s view. With ambivalence similar to DiMatteo’s, Karl
Llewellyn, though he criticizes the Sun Printing opinion as “labored
and unsatisfactory” as well as a “bothering step backward,” 106 blames
the buyer’s lawyers rather than Cardozo for the outcome because the
lawyers’ “bad pleadings” failed to provide the relevant commercial or
contextual reading of the contract. 107 Charles Brower and Randy
Barnett, responding to Crane’s dissent, contend that the fact that
Crane was able to come up with so many alternative ways for the
court to fill the gap actually proves Cardozo’s point, which was that
the court had no basis for choosing from among the various
possibilities the one that best represented the parties’ intent. 108 Curtis
Bridgeman sees Sun Printing as an example of Cardozo’s willingness
to adhere to formalism in that “Cardozo considered himself bound to
the formal rules of contract even in some cases where they seemed to

105

DiMatteo, supra note 98, at 340.
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 242 (1960).
107 Id. at 242 n.243. See also Lawrence A. Cunningham, Cardozo and Posner: A Study in
Contracts, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1379, 1393 n.72 (1995) (noting that Sun Printing is best
viewed as a “pleadings case” in that, unlike the dissent, Cardozo was not willing to “assume
facts about a particular commodity market” but demanded that the plaintiff buyer plead those
facts); KAUFMAN, supra note 86, at 322 (arguing that Cardozo’s “position was quite
straightforward”: he found an “important gap in the terms of the agreement” and the
“plaintiff had produced no evidence of business usage that would fill the gap,” a “defect”
that “was fatal”). But see DiMatteo, supra note 98, at 339 (criticizing Cardozo’s statements
concerning the uncertainty in the record about whether the Canadian Export Paper Company
price was fluctuating as “retreat[ing] into the nuance of unsubstantiated facts”).
108 Charles H. Brower II, Mind the Gap, 2016 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 11. In Brower’s words:
While appealing in some respects, the menu of options presented by
Judge Crane simply reinforced Cardozo’s main point. In the absence of
any contractual basis, the court had no disciplined basis on which to
supply the omitted term. Although the court might choose any number
of solutions, each one might produce vastly different economic
consequences in a rising market, none of which may have laid within the
contemplation of the parties. In other words, the court would be pulling
numbers out of thin air, and that did not constitute a judicial act.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also RANDY BARNETT, CONTRACTS 98 (2010) (“Crane’s ability to
articulate numerous different ways of filling in the gap unintentionally supported Cardozo’s
conclusion that this contract was too indefinite to be enforced.”).
106
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give an unjust, or at least unhappy, result.” 109 Focusing on Cardozo’s
argument that enforcing the contract would put the seller at the mercy
of the buyer, Lawrence Cunningham justifies the decision as an
example of Cardozo’s desire to deter opportunistic behavior by
contracting parties. 110
Perhaps most notably, Andrew Kaufman, in his majestic
biography of Cardozo, defends Sun Printing on the ground that
parties who write defectively incomplete contracts should bear the
consequences. Kaufman writes:
Cardozo certainly believed in creative interpretation of
the language of business contracts to comport with the
commercial background. He was not willing, though,
to push interpretation to the point where it appeared to
him to be revision of a contract that was invalid as
written. He would not manipulate the rules of contract
interpretation to do justice on an individual case
basis. . . . Cardozo’s bottom line in Sun Printing was
that there were areas of commercial dealing where the
parties either by design or accident did not reach
binding agreements, and in those areas they took their
chances. . . . Cardozo’s opinion reflected one of his

109 Curtis Bridgeman, Allegheny College Revisited: Cardozo, Consideration, and
Formalism in Context, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 149, 184-85 (2005).
110 Cunningham, supra note 107, at 1394-95. Cunningham argues:
If the writing were taken to mean that the buyer had agreed to pay the
specified ceiling price, the seller would have been “at the mercy of the
buyer” with respect to the duration of that price. For example, the buyer
could have insisted on paying the ceiling price for so long as it was
favorable, and when it became unfavorable, the buyer could then have
refused to do so. In short, under the contract as written, the seller had no
basis for knowing the duration of the price. Thus, while it would be
correct to understand Cardozo’s decision in Sun Printing as a refusal to
make contracts for the parties and therefore to embrace the principle of
freedom of contract, the case warrants a finer reading. It also reflects an
unwillingness to countenance exploitive terms to which the parties
would most likely not have agreed.
Cunningham, supra note 107, at 1394-95 (footnotes omitted). In Cunningham’s view, the
anti-opportunism approach (i.e., an approach that avoids interpretations that would put one
contracting party “at the mercy” of the other) unifies Cardozo’s decisions in Sun Printing
and Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon. See Cunningham, supra note 107, at 1393-97.
DiMatteo challenges Cunningham’s mercy argument, contending that in Sun Printing, unlike
Wood, “[i]njustice was not prevented, but was incurred with the non-enforcement of the
contract.” DiMatteo, supra note 98, at 338.
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major instincts – that life, particularly life in modern
industrial society, was risky, and that acceptance of a
large measure of risk was a necessary cost attending
the rewards. In contracts, as in torts, the law offered
some protection, but only so much. There were times
when people and businesses had to look out for
themselves. 111
Other commentators, rather than agreeing or disagreeing with
Sun Printing, use the case to illustrate broader points about
contracting or contract law or theory. Stewart Macaulay, in his
classic article on non-contractual relations in business, references Sun
Printing (without citing it by name) as an example of the irrelevance
of contract law by arguing that the case has had no effect on either
contracts in the industry or on business behavior more generally. 112
Randy Barnett sees the case as representing a conflict over whether
more than intention to be legally bound is necessary for a contract to
be enforceable, with Crane taking the position that intent to be legally
bound is sufficient and Cardozo taking the position that “more than
this is required for an enforceable contract to exist.” 113 Specifically,
Cardozo’s view is that if “the parties have failed to make their own
private law for the courts to enforce,” they “should be free from
having terms to which they did not consent imposed on them by a
court.” 114
Several commentators use Sun Printing as a vehicle for
discussing the possibility of “cure by concession” as a solution
111

KAUFMAN, supra note 86, at 323-24.
Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28
AM. SOC. REV. 55, 60 (1963) (“The standard contract used by manufacturers of paper to sell
to magazine publishers has a pricing clause which is probably sufficiently vague to make the
contract legally unenforceable. The house counsel of one of the largest paper producers [in
Wisconsin] said that everyone in the industry is aware of this because of a leading New York
case concerning the contract, but that no one cares”). See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS § 3.29, p. 213 n.11 (4th ed. 2004) (quoting this passage and stating that it refers
to Sun Printing); see also KAUFMAN, supra note 86, at 323. Professor Kaufman reads
Macaulay’s statement as a “practical confirmation” of Cardozo’s position because it shows
that “[b]uyers and sellers in that industry have apparently decided to gain flexibility by
leaving some uncertainty in their dealings.” An alternative interpretation of Macaulay’s
description is that contracting parties in the newsprint industry are willing to live with the
Sun Printing rule, not that they prefer it. It is just not worth it to them to contract around it
because specifying a more definite price is costly and, in most cases, they work things out.
113 Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78
VA. L. REV. 821, 871 (1992).
114 Id.
112
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to indefinite contracts. Omri Ben-Shahar describes this approach,
which he reframes as a “no-retraction principle,” as follows: “The
party who seeks enforcement of the incomplete agreement is granted
an option to enforce the transaction supplemented with terms that are
the most favorable (within reason) to the other party.” 115 Unlike a
“majoritarian” approach to contractual gap-filling, which “imposes”
terms on contracting parties, under the cure by concession view, “the
missing terms must be such that the completed deal is guaranteed to
be no worse than what the retracting party could have presumptively
intended when the incomplete promise was made, and it is enforced
only if the promisee so chooses.” 116 Ben-Shahar then argues that
Cardozo seemed willing to adopt this approach in Sun Printing, but
Cardozo declined to do so because the contract omitted price
duration, as well as price, and the buyer did not concede to accept the
price duration term most favorable to the seller. 117
Finally, several commentators suggest that the Uniform
Commercial Code and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts reject
the rationale of Sun Printing and would dictate a different result if the
case were to be decided today. 118 In fact, it is quite possible that
115 Omri Ben-Shahar, Contracts Without Consent: Exploring a New Basis for Contractual
Liability, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1829, 1862 (2004).
116 Id. at 1863.
117 Professors Farnsworth and Barnett offer variations on this theme. Farnsworth, in his
treatise, states: “On the court’s own reasoning, had the buyer offered to pay the highest price
for the month of delivery or any preceding month during the period subject to agreement,
instead of merely offering to pay the Canadian price for the month of delivery, there would
appear no reason to refuse to enforce the agreement.” FARNSWORTH, supra note 112, at §
3.29, p. 213. It is not clear why Farnsworth refers to the “preceding” month rather than
“succeeding” months, or why he focuses on the “highest price for the month” rather than the
Canadian Export Paper Company price at the time of renewal. Barnett suggests that the
buyer might have prevailed if it had “committed itself to pay for the duration of the
agreement any monthly increases in the Canadian standard price, and continued to pay the
increased price even if the Canadian standard price later fell.” Barnett, supra note 113, at
869. It is not clear why Barnett believes the buyer should have had to commit itself to the
highest Canadian Export Paper Company price even if that price later fell. The ambiguity in
how to apply the “cure by concession” approach, represented by these two versions, may
suggest difficulties in adopting this approach.
118 See Barnett, supra note 113, at 870 (“Today, of course, courts would likely reach a
different outcome by interpreting the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) to fill the price
term gap.”); see Cunningham, supra note 107, at 1394 n.76, 1407 (“While the dissent’s
approach in Sun Printing was resisted at common law, it has been expressly sanctioned by
the U.C.C.”) (stating that “the received understanding of Sun Printing – holding that a
contract that does not fix a price term is unenforceable – [was] reversed by section 2-305 of
the Uniform Commercial Code”); see also Daniel P. O’Gorman, The Restatement (Second)
of Contracts’ Reasonably Certain Terms Requirement: A Model of Neoclassical Contract
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Cardozo could have reached the same result were he to be deciding
the case today. UCC § 2-305(1)(b) states:
The parties if they so intend can conclude a contract
for sale even though the price is not settled. In such a
case the price is a reasonable price at the time for
delivery if . . . the price is left to be agreed by the
parties and they fail to agree.
Comment 1 to that section adds that if the requirements of
UCC § 2-305 are met, the UCC “rejects . . . the formula that ‘an
agreement to agree is unenforceable.’” On the other hand, UCC § 2305(4) states: “Where, however, the parties intend not to be bound
unless the price be fixed or agreed and it is not fixed or agreed there
is no contract.” Thus, the key question is what the parties intended to
happen if they could not reach agreement. Although Cardozo is
somewhat ambiguous on this point, one could read him to be saying
that the parties intended not to be bound unless they agreed on price
and price duration. More important, UCC § 2-305 addresses only an
“Open Price Term.” It says nothing about price duration, which
Cardozo viewed as a separate term (though one obviously intertwined
with the price term). 119 If § 2-305 does not apply, the UCC’s general
gap-filling provision, § 2-204(3) would apply. That section states:
“Even though one or more terms are left open, a contract for sale
does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a
contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an
appropriate remedy.” 120 Under that language, Cardozo would seem
Law and a Model of Confusion and Inconsistency, 36 U. HAW. L. REV. 169, 236 n.388
(2014) (stating that Restatement (Second) § 204 cmt. d and UCC § 2-305 both reject the
rationale in Sun Printing).
119 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 112, at § 3.29, p. 213 n.11 (“Since the court [in Sun
Printing] viewed the indefiniteness as one of time as well as price, U.C.C. § 2-305 does not
compel a different result.”).
120 U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (2016). Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33 is similar to U.C.C.
§ 2-204(3). It states:
(1) Even though a manifestation of intention is intended to be understood
as an offer, it cannot be accepted so as to form a contract unless the
terms of the contract are reasonably certain.
(2) The terms of a contract are reasonably certain if they provide a basis
for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate
remedy.
(3) The fact that one or more terms of a proposed bargain are left open or
uncertain may show that a manifestation of intention is not intended to
be understood as an offer or as an acceptance.
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to have ample room to reach the same result he did in Sun Printing.
One could easily imagine Cardozo deciding both that the parties did
not “intend to make a contract” absent agreement on the price and
price duration terms, and that in any case, there was no principled
basis for determining a remedy.
III.

THE CONTEXT OF SUN PRINTING

As Cardozo presents the case, Sun Printing appears to involve
a garden variety commercial contract between two large entities
concerning a standardized good in a thick market. Thus, the case
seems like a paradigmatic example of the type of “A vs. B”
abstraction common in Restatement illustrations and other types of
legal analysis. Limited by the information provided by the buyer in
its complaint, Cardozo offers no hint as to who the parties are, the
circumstances surrounding their agreement, why they might have
chosen to structure the deal the way they did, or why the seller was
dissatisfied with the contract. Suppose, however, that we dig a little
deeper. What would we find? And does it matter? 121
A. Background to the Contract
Sun Printing & Publishing Association published the New
York Sun, which at the time the case arose was one of the leading
urban newspapers in the country, with both daily and Sunday
editions. It was best known for having declared, “Yes, Virginia,
there is a Santa Claus” in 1897 (and repeatedly thereafter). 122 The
Sun was “widely read by well-off people” and had initially withheld
its endorsement from Cardozo when he ran for judge of the New
York Supreme Court in 1913, though it did wind up endorsing him
shortly before the election. 123
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 (1981).
121 In his philosophical writings, Cardozo argued that contextual facts should matter in
business cases. See CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 124-25 (“Often the question before the court
is concerned with the rule that is to regulate some business enterprise or transaction. The
facts of economic and business life are then relevant considerations.”).
122 National Endowment for the Humanities, Chronicling America: Historic American
Newspapers, LIBR. OF CONG., http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83030272/ (last
visited Oct. 27, 2017).
123 KAUFMAN, supra note 86, at 122. Kaufman does not suggest that Cardozo harbored
any ill will toward the Sun at the time, or later, and in any case the idea that Cardozo would
base his decision on any personal animus toward Sun Printing is wholly inconsistent with the
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Remington Paper & Power Company, headquartered in
Watertown, New York, and originally founded in 1865, 124 was a
large manufacturer of paper, including newsprint.
In 1916,
Remington was the fifth largest producer of newsprint paper in the
United States and the eleventh largest in the U.S. and Canada
combined. 125 In that year, Remington produced 49,426 tons of
paper, 126 and in 1920, Remington’s daily tonnage was 156 (56,940
per year), 127 which means that the 12,000-ton annual quantity stated
in the contract was a significant portion (more than 20%) of
Remington’s annual production.
The manufacture of newsprint paper from wood pulp began
in the 1860s. 128 By the time of the contract, the market
had grown significantly. The newsprint market was somewhat
segmented. There were the large daily newspapers, of which the
New York Sun was one. There were a larger number of smaller
daily newspapers. And there were weekly newspapers. The daily
newspapers tended to buy their newsprint through contracts, 129 with
the larger dailies dealing directly with the manufacturers and the
smaller dailies contracting through middlemen (jobbers). The weekly
newspapers generally bought newsprint in the open (spot) market. 130
In the years preceding the contract, the newsprint paper
industry had undergone significant turmoil. Between 1910 and 1915,
competition in the industry had increased significantly, as a number
of new Canadian mills sprang up and older mills added newer, more
efficient machines. These Canadian mills, which exported most of
their newsprint to the Unites States, 131 had several advantages over
picture Kaufman paints of him in the book.
124 See Howard J. Palmer, The History of Paper Making in Northern New York, Paper: A
Weekly Technical Journal for Paper and Pulp Mills, at 15-16 (Mar. 16, 1921). The
company was organized by Alfred D. Remington, son of Illustrious Remington, who had
founded his first mill in Watertown along with Alfred in 1854.
125 FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT ON THE NEWS-PRINT PAPER INDUSTRY 33 (1917)
[hereinafter “FTC 1917 Report”]. Remington’s share of the U.S. production was 3.6% and
its share of the US and Canadian production was 2.5%. Id. Remington operated three
newsprint mills containing five paper machines. Id. at 35.
126 Id. at 33.
127 Newsprint Paper Industry: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Mfrs. U.S.
Sen., 66th Cong. 508-09 (1920) [hereinafter “Senate Subcommittee Hearings”].
128 Id. at 441.
129 Id. at 473 (“About 90 per cent of the total shipments of news-print paper is sold under
contract.”).
130 Id. at 118.
131 Id. at 114. By 1916, Canada furnished about 30% of all the newsprint used in the
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their American counterparts, including access to cheap wood and
cheap water power. 132 In addition, in 1911 the U.S. removed tariff
duties from imports of newsprint from Canadian companies. As a
result, Canadian manufacturers could sell newsprint for an average of
$.225 per 100 lbs. ($4.50/ton) less than American manufacturers. 133
The increase in the number of Canadian mills, as well as their price
advantage, led to declining prices for newsprint and gave newspaper
publishers a market advantage, which they used to secure favorable
contract terms, including flexible quantity terms 134 and terms
requiring manufacturers to pay for shipping costs. 135
In 1916, the newsprint market become more favorable to
manufacturers, as prices began to increase and manufacturers were
able to negotiate better contract terms with the large newspaper
publishers. 136 In part, this shift resulted from the increased demand
for newsprint, as businesses sought more advertising in newspapers
to reduce their corporate income taxes and the general public
hungered for news of World War I, both of which increased the
length of newspapers. 137 Demand by foreign buyers also increased
because of a shortage of paper in foreign markets. 138 Demand for
non-newsprint paper also increased, and manufacturers shifted some
production away from newsprint to more profitable types of paper. 139
The manufacturers claimed they could not meet all of this higher
demand with existing mill capacity. 140 In addition, manufacturers
faced higher production costs, such as a shortage of coal supplies. 141
A final factor was that in April 1915, the newsprint paper

United States. Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 45.
132 E.O. Merchant, The Government and the News-Print Paper Manufacturers, 32 Q. J.
ECON. 238, 240 (1918) [hereinafter “Merchant I”].
133 Id.; see also FTC 1917 Report, supra note 125, at 45.
134 FTC 1917 Report, supra note 125, at 56 (stating that before 1917, it was common to
have quantity terms that included some flexibility, such as a maximum and minimum or a
stated quantity with a stated percentage deviation allowance).
135 Merchant I, supra note 132, at 240-41.
136 FTC 1917 Report, supra note 125, at 132.
137 Merchant I, supra note 132, at 241; FTC 1917 Report, supra note 125, at 132; S. REP.
NO. 662, at 3 (1920) [hereinafter “Senate 1920 Report”].
138 Merchant I, supra note 132, at 242.
139 Merchant I, supra note 132, at 242; Senate 1920 Report, supra note 137, at 3.
140 Merchant I, supra note 132, at 242; but see FTC 1917 Report, supra note 125, at 134
(“While there was approximately enough paper to go around, publishers were fearful that
they could not get their supply.”).
141 Merchant I, supra note 132, at 243.
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manufacturers had decided to form the News-Print Manufacturers
Association, in hopes of improving conditions for the mills.142
Remington was a member of the Association. Another member of
the Association was the Canadian Export Paper Company, which was
formed in 1916 to pool the export business of, and act as agent for,
five of the biggest Canadian companies representing one-third of
Canadian output of newsprint paper. 143 The activity of the
Association may also have artificially restricted newsprint output and
contributed to the price increases of 1916. 144
The large daily newspapers, which bought most of the
newsprint, enjoyed more favorable prices and terms than the
smaller purchasers, which often purchased their newsprint through
intermediaries (jobbers). The larger publishers, some of which
purchased 100 tons of newsprint per day, typically had year-long
contracts generally corresponding with the calendar year, while
the smaller publishers purchased their newsprint in the more
expensive spot market. 145 As a result of their advantages, many of
the publishers of the large daily newspapers “did not feel the effects
of the rising prices until the end of 1916, when their favorable
contracts expired.” 146 In the 1917 contracts, many manufacturers
switched to “f.o.b. mill” pricing, meaning the publishers had to pay
for transportation. In addition, the manufacturers eliminated the
previously existing flexibility publishers had enjoyed on quantity. 147
Meanwhile, in response to complaints by the publishers, the
federal antitrust regulators got involved. At the request of Congress,
the Federal Trade Commission began an investigation. A report by
the FTC “found that prices had been increased in the year 1917 more
than could be justified by increased cost” and “that the increase had
142

Merchant I, supra note 132, at 238; FTC 1917 Report, supra note 125, at 40.
FTC 1917 Report, supra note 125, at 42. According to testimony before the Senate
Subcommittee by Alva Snyder, an examiner for the FTC, George F. Steele, the secretary of
the Newsprint Manufacturers’ Association, had advocated the formation of the Canadian
Export Paper Company after the FTC and Attorney General’s investigations had started. See
Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, part 2, at 121.
144 Merchant I, supra note 132, at 239; FTC 1917 Report, supra note 125, at 41-42, 132;
Senate 1920 Report, supra note 137, at 3.
145 Merchant I, supra note 132, at 240; FTC 1917 Report, supra note 125, at 48, 132.
146 Merchant I, supra note 132, at 243.
147 FTC 1917 Report, supra note 125, at 56; see also Senate 1920 Report, supra note 137,
at 1 (noting the shift from f.o.b. destination pricing to f.o.b. mill pricing by the end of 1916,
as well as a “strict rule against allowing leeway in tonnage to the buyer, who was compelled
to take his allotment monthly whether he needed it or not”).
143
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been due, in part, to the restriction of competition by important
manufacturers in Canada and the United States.” 148
More
specifically, the FTC uncovered evidence that the newsprint
manufacturers, acting through their Association, had tacitly agreed
not to interfere with one another’s customers, restricted production,
and prevented or discouraged the building of new mills. 149 Based on
this evidence, the Department of Justice brought a criminal antitrust
action against seven newsprint manufacturers (not including
Remington), five of whom pleaded nolo contendere and agreed to
price regulation by the Federal Trade Commission for the duration of
the war and three months thereafter. 150 In response to a subsequent
proceeding by the Department of Justice, the newsprint
manufacturers (including Remington) agreed to disband the
Association, 151 though the FTC agreed to collect and publish industry
data. 152 The former secretary of the Association, George F. Steele,
became the general manager of the Canadian Export Paper Co. 153
In 1918, the newsprint manufacturers that had settled with the
Department of Justice and the publishers fought in various
proceedings over the price set by the FTC. The manufacturers
succeeded in getting the FTC to raise the regulated price, and the
publishers’ attempt to get the FTC or the courts to reopen the case
failed. The resulting price for the second half of 1918, $3.7525 per
100 pounds, was, in the words of one economist, “a complete victory
for the manufacturers,” because they “succeeded in getting a price for
their product at least as high if not higher than they would have
obtained if there had been no proceedings of any kind.” 154 Reaching
a similar conclusion, but under a different rationale, a Senate Report
in 1920 concluded that the newsprint manufacturers had effected a
“virtual nullification of the law” 155 by exploiting a provision in the
FTC settlement allowing manufacturers to receive higher prices than
the regulated price under the settlement, provided that the price was
148

J.A. Guthrie, Price Regulation in the Paper Industry, 60 Q. J. ECON. 194, 198 (1946).
Merchant I, supra note 132, at 248.
150 Merchant I, supra note 132, at 249.
151 Merchant I, supra note 132, at 250.
152 Merchant I, supra note 132, at 253.
153 Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 121 (testimony of Alva Snyder,
examiner for the FTC).
154 E. O. Merchant, The Government and the News-Print Paper Manufacturers, 34 Q. J.
ECON. 313, 327 (1920) [hereinafter “Merchant II”].
155 Senate 1920 Report, supra note 137, at 4.
149
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satisfactory to the publisher. 156
That brings us to the summer of 1919, the time of the Sun
Printing agreement. At that time, World War I had been over for less
than a year. In addition, the FTC price regulation regime had ended.
What were the prospects for the future of the newsprint market at that
time? Concerns about high and rising prices in the newsprint
industry remained. As with the price increase in 1916, the causes of
concern were some combination of market conditions leading to a
shortage of newsprint and anticompetitive practices by newsprint
manufacturers. On the market condition side, one economist
published an article in February 1920 (thus likely written in the fall of
1919), which stated:
Government investigations and price fixing during the
war undoubtedly tended to discourage and retard the
expansion of the industry. This was particularly true of
the prices fixed by the Canadian government, which
were somewhat lower than those established in the
United States. During recent months the revival of
business and the excess profits tax have stimulated
such a volume of advertising and consequently such a
demand for print paper that the capacity of existing
mills has been entirely inadequate to cope with the
situation. As a result we are now witnessing a paper
shortage and famine prices which eclipse anything that
occurred during the war. 157
Another economist, writing several decades later in 1946,
suggested that anticompetitive practices may have continued during
156 Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 433-36. In fact, the Canadian
Export Paper Company included such a “waiver” in its 1919 and 1920 contracts. “The seller
has offered to sell and deliver paper to the purchaser in accordance with the provisions of an
agreement between the Attorney General of the United States as trustee, and various
manufacturers of newsprint paper, . . . and this contract is made with full knowledge on the
part of the purchaser of the provisions of said agreement, and the purchaser hereby waives
the benefit of any and all provisions of said agreement and represents that it prefers to make
this contract regardless of the provisions of said agreement, and that in entering into this
contract is acting in its own interest.” Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at
431.
157 Merchant II, supra note 154, at 328. In addition to the Government war restrictions
mentioned by Merchant, the War Industries Board also apparently regulated the size of
newspapers to conserve on paper. See Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at
112 (Testimony of Fleming Newbold, Business Manager of the Washington D.C. Evening
Star). Removing those regulations would also predictably lead to a greater use of newsprint.
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this time: “A rise in prices caused by increased demand and reduced
supply of paper of all kinds during World War I provided a favorable
opportunity for restraint and suppression of price competition in
several branches of the industry.” 158 Moreover: “During World War I
and for a few years thereafter, conditions of demand and supply
favored paper manufacturers. Prices rose rapidly, price agreements
among sellers were fairly numerous, and price competition was
frequently suppressed.” 159
Similarly, a Senate Report from March 1920 concluded that in
the immediately preceding years “there has existed a shortage of
newsprint paper,” and that “certain newsprint manufacturers have
taken advantage of this shortage to exploit the purchasers of such
paper and hold them up for excessive, unreasonable, and wholly
unfair prices.” 160 The Report added that
many of the newsprint makers here and in Canada
were acting in collusion, with the apparent intent to
bring about restraint of the normal flow of trade and
engage in unfair competition by methods in some
cases of creating an artificial supply and in others of
resorting indirectly through their bureaus of statistics
to an actual fixing of price. 161
A somewhat different view of the newsprint market during
the 1919-1920 period appeared in a trade journal of the newsprint
manufacturers. The journal published the text of a speech given
by W. J. Pape, president of a group called the Publishers Buying
Corporation. 162 According to data provided by Pape, newsprint
production in the U.S. and Canada increased in 1919 over the
previous year by 183,000 tons, from 2,000,000 tons to 2,183,000
tons, and increased yet again in 1920 to 2,395,000 tons, for a nearly
20% increase over the two-year period, “notwithstanding the drop in
production and the stoppage of new construction caused by the
war.” 163 Thus, according to Pape, there was no shortage, artificial or
otherwise, of newsprint. Instead, Pape argued that prices rose during
158

Guthrie, supra note 148, at 203.
Guthrie, supra note 148, at 211.
160 Senate 1920 Report, supra note 137, at 2.
161 Senate 1920 Report, supra note 137, at 2.
162 W. J. Pape, Publishers Admit Responsibility for Recent High Newsprint Prices, A
WEEKLY TECHNICAL JOURNAL FOR PAPER AND PULP MILLS, Mar. 23, 1921, at 9.
163 Id. at 9.
159
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this period because of the strong increase in demand by newspaper
publishers, an increase that the publishers knew was coming.
According to Pape, in the early months of 1919 “the newspapers
knew that the greatest boom in advertising ever known was about to
begin. It was being prophesied by their association, the advertising
agencies and the trade press. A period of record consumption of
newsprint was at hand.” 164 By July 1919, the spot price, which
earlier in the year had been below the average contract price of $75
per ton ($3.75 per 100 pounds), rose above that price. Pape chided
the publishers who did not adequately prepare for the impending
increase in demand by securing reserves of newsprint when spot
market prices were low, but instead “preferr[ed] to run on a hand-tomouth policy.” 165
As for the manufacturers, Pape argued that “it does not seem
to have occurred to the manufacturers in the early fall of 1919 that
prices would be abnormally high in 1920.” Once 1920 rolled around,
however, the larger manufacturers “raised their contract prices for
1920 to $80, $90, and $100 a ton,” (corresponding to $4, $4.50,
and $5 per 100 pounds) and “[o]ne eastern mill surprised other
manufacturers and scandalized eastern consumers by charging its
consumers $130 a ton [$6.50 per 100 pounds] on its 1920
contracts.” 166 Pape’s view was that the publishers, not the
manufacturers, were to blame for the higher contract prices and
significantly higher spot prices (between $200 and $440 per ton,
corresponding to $10 and $22 per 100 pounds) in 1920. 167 Naturally,
the manufacturers’ trade journal was happy to print this speech. The
Publishers Buying Corporation, of which Pape was president, was
formed in April 1920 in response to the crisis. Thus, although Pape
disagrees with the cause of the rising prices during late 1919 and
1920, in a way that perhaps not coincidentally supports the formation
and importance of the newly formed entity he was heading, he
confirms that the higher prices in the foreseeable future could or
should have been anticipated at least by the publishers in the summer
of 1919.
164

Id. at 10.
Id.
166 Id. at 11.
167 Pape, supra note 162, at 11 (According to Pape, “90 percent of the 1920 tonnage was
sold under contract and . . . the extortionate spot prices applied to only about 5 percent of the
production.”).
165
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B. The Contract
Given that background, we may now consider why the parties
might have written the contract the way they did. Many of the
contract provisions corresponded with the usual practice in the
newsprint paper market, and likely with Remington’s prior contracts
given that (according to Judge Crane’s dissent) the contract was
based on Remington’s standard form. First, the contract term was
structured consistently with a year-long contract based on the
calendar year. The contract had fixed prices for the last four months
of 1919 and then provided for a reset of prices at the beginning of the
calendar year 1920. Second, the fact that the parties left prices
“open” for 1920 was also consistent with standard practice in the
industry. Prices in the newsprint market did not stay constant over
the year and future market prices were hard to predict. Third, the fact
that the parties did set prices for the first four months is also
consistent with standard industry practice. Many, if not most,
contracts in the newsprint industry at that time provided for price
resets every quarter. 168 The first month of the contract, September
1919, was the last month of the third quarter of 1919 and had a fixed
price, most likely based on the prices for that quarter that existed in
contracts in the industry, 169 which would have been known to the
parties. The next three months of the contract (October-December
1919) had a higher fixed price, which could have been based on a
reasonable prediction of what market prices were likely to be in the
last quarter (most of those contract prices would probably have been
determined around the same time or not long after the contract was
made).

168 See Senate 1920 Report, supra note 137, at 2. The Report states that in the three years
before 1920, “the contracts nearly all have the same terms of delivery and reserve the right to
readjust terms quarterly. Even the large publishers can not to-day, in most cases, contract for
a year’s supply at a fixed annual price. The mills, with few exceptions, reserve the right to
fix prices quarterly and there is invariably a rise in price each quarter. Moreover, it has been
the custom of the large manufacturers during the past three years to notify their customers in
advance that it would be necessary to reduce their previous allotments.” That was apparently
a change from the years leading up to 1917. See FTC 1917 Report, supra note 125, at 48
(stating that most newsprint bought by the large dailies at the time was pursuant to one-year
contracts at fixed prices).
169 The price stated in the contract for September 1919 was $3.73 3/4 per 100 pounds or
$74.75 per ton. W. J. Paper, president of the Publishers Buying Corporation, reported an
average contract price of $75 per ton in July 1919. See Pape, supra note 162, at 10.
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1. The Sixteen-Month Duration
The contract did, however, contain several apparently unique
features, including the open price duration term emphasized by
Cardozo and at the heart of his view of the case. But that was not the
only unusual feature of the contract. For some reason, Sun Printing
found itself in need of a new contract before the end of 1919.
Perhaps Sun Printing’s needs for paper increased beyond what it had
contracted for at the beginning of 1919, or perhaps Sun Printing had
contracted with a different manufacturer for 1919 and either Sun
Printing or its contracting partner had decided not to perform. In
response to this situation, Sun Printing and Remington could have
chosen simply to contract for the remainder of 1919 and then enter
into a new contract for 1920 in December 1919, but they did not.
Instead, they stipulated that the relationship would last for sixteen
months. Whether this attempted locking in of a contract partner for
1920 was more important to the buyer or the seller or whether it was
of equal importance to both parties is not clear. Even though both
parties may have wanted to ensure the stability of a longer-term
relationship, there were plenty of alternative publishers and paper
manufacturers for the parties to deal with. We can get some
information, however, from what we know of the market conditions
existing at the time as reflected in the other contract provisions.
2. The Price Ceiling
The key provision, another apparently unique feature of the
contract, was the stipulation that the price could be no “higher than
the contract price for newsprint charged by the Canadian Export
Company to the large consumers.” This provision was a price
maximum or ceiling. The most natural reason the parties would
agree to a price ceiling and not a floor is that they thought there was a
reasonable possibility that market prices would increase over the term
of the contract. That the parties contemplated higher prices over the
term of the contract is further reflected in the fact that the stated price
for the last three months of 1919 was higher than the stated price for
September 1919. 170 Moreover, the expectation of higher prices was
170 Two alternative possibilities are that the September 1919 price was some kind of price
discount by Remington to induce Sun Printing to agree to the sixteen-month contract, or –
less likely – that the October-December price was some kind of above-market price designed
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supported by the prevailing market conditions at the time, as noted in
the last section. These market conditions included not only increased
demand for newsprint, which could lead to a newsprint shortage, but
also the concern with recent and possibly continuing anti-competitive
(collusive) behavior by the newspaper manufacturers. Either of these
scenarios could have led Sun Printing to want to lock in a contract for
1920 early.
Of course, it is possible that market prices could have fallen
over the term of the contract. 171 Some unexpected new technology
could have been invented that reduced production costs for paper
manufacturers significantly, for example. Alternatively, exports from
other countries could have increased. But neither these, nor other
typical causes of falling prices seemed to be on the horizon.172
Although new plants and adding new machines to existing plants
could increase capacity and competition, as had happened earlier in
the decade, the Association (according to the Government, at least)
and World War I suppressed the building of new plants. Government
supervision over prices had only recently ended and even if
manufacturers decided to build new plants or add new machines, it
would take some time to do those things and other parties in the
market would likely know well in advance of future enhanced
capacity. 173 It’s telling, for example, that Remington (as discussed

to induce Remington to agree to the longer-term contract. I have found no evidence to
support either of these possibilities.
171 Frank A. Munsey, publisher of the New York Sun, as well as the New York Herald,
New York Evening Telegram, and the Baltimore News, testified before the Senate
Subcommittee that some publishers did not make contracts for the 1920 year. He said,
“There are many men who believed that paper would go lower.” Senate Subcommittee
Hearings, supra note 127, at 148. He then added that even he underestimated how much the
price would rise: “I must say that my judgment was very bad in that respect. I did not expect
to see paper keep on climbing the way it has.” Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note
127, at 148. Indirectly, Munsey’s testimony supports the idea that Munsey at least was
expecting prices to rise and that concern was motivating him to make the contract with
Remington.
172 Howard Palmer, The History of Paper Making in Northern New York – Part VII,
Paper: A WEEKLY TECHNICAL JOURNAL FOR PAPER AND PULP MILLS, Mar. 30, 1921, at 13
(stating that between 1916 and 1921 there had been “[n]o radical changes made in the mills”
other than “replacing some of the machinery and the rebuilding of the paper machines to
make them faster”).
173 Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 419-20 (testimony of Victor F.
Lawson, publisher of the Chicago Daily News, that new mills to alleviate the then-existing
newsprint shortage would take about two years to build and that adding additional machinery
would take several months); Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 27
(testimony of George McAneny, Executive Manager of the New York Times, that the
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below) was at the time of the contract proposing to increase its
capacity by merger, which would not increase the capacity of the
industry as a whole, rather than by building a new plant. Nor was
there any reason to suppose a decline in demand for newsprint. Yes,
the war had ended, which could have reduced demand, but any such
tendency would have probably been evident by the summer of 1919,
when the contract was made. Instead, the indications were that, if
anything, demand for newsprint was likely to increase, 174 especially
since businesses were starting to recover from the war and taking out
more advertising space in newspapers.
Finally, it is possible that the Government had succeeded
through its antitrust enforcement activity in eliminating the risk of
collusive behavior in the newsprint industry, which would lead to
more competition and hence lower prices. That does not seem to
have been the perception at the time the contract was drafted,
however. On August 20, 1919, right around the time the contract was
likely entered into, the U.S. Senate passed Resolution 164,
authorizing an investigation into “the news-print paper industry and
to ascertain whether it is now or has been engaged in discriminatory,
unjust, or illegal practice, and whether the prices now being charged
for news-print paper or similar products are excessive, and the causes
for existing prices.” 175 Although it is possible that the parties might
have thought that swift Senate action would potentially lead to
declining prices in 1920, it seems equally if not more plausible that,
given the past spotty antitrust record of the Government, the Senate’s
huffing and puffing would not have much practical effect on the
newsprint manufacturers’ behavior. In fact, on March 6, 1920, just a
few months after Remington abandoned the contract, the House of
Representatives asked the Secretary of Commerce to provide
information concerning “any shortage in the supply of . . . print paper
and the classes of newspapers or periodicals that have been affected
by such shortage.” 176 Of course, it is possible that the shortage of
supply would not have been apparent to the parties in August 1919,
Canadian Export Paper Company had installed new machines in November 1919 but they
would not “go in under a year, or until 1922”). Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note
127, at 27.
174 A.R.R. Jones, Canadian Export Paper Co’s Huge Operations: PULP & PAPER
MAGAZINE, May 5, 1921 at 476 (stating, in 1921, that “the last few years have witnessed an
unprecedented and unparalleled demand for products of the [paper] industry”).
175 S. RES. 164, 66th Cong., (Aug. 20, 1919).
176 H.R. RES. 489, 66th Cong., at 257 (Mar. 6, 1920).
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but given that the industry likely knew what was going on some time
before Congress, this evidence provides at least some support for the
notion that the expectation at the time of the contract was rising
prices, or at most continued high prices, not declining prices.
The price ceiling had other important and interesting features.
First, as Cardozo noted, the maximum was not a numerical price but
based on prices charged by the Canadian Export Paper Company.
The Canadian Export Paper Company was not a manufacturer, but
instead a “central sales organization,” based in Montreal, that handled
the output of several of Canada’s top paper mills. 177 Why would the
parties peg the maximum to the price charged by the Canadian
Export Paper Company? One possibility, noted by Judge Crane’s
dissent, was that the Canadian price was not a “fluctuating price,” but
was likely to be stable for the full year. This suggestion is
implausible, based both on the nature of the contract and the history
of the paper industry, and Cardozo was correct to challenge it. If the
parties wanted a price maximum that would not fluctuate over the
term of the contract, one would have expected them to state that price
maximum explicitly in the contract rather than reference the
Canadian Export Paper Company price. Moreover, most contracts in
the newsprint industry, as we have seen, involved prices that were not
fixed but were periodically reset over the generally year-long term of
the contracts. There was no reason to believe the Canadian Export
Paper Company price did not conform to that business norm.
Another possible reason to peg the maximum price to the
Canadian Export Paper Company price would be that the Canadian
company’s prices tended to be fair representations of the going
“market” price. Apparently, the Canadian Export Paper Company
had “a highly efficient and well equipped statistical department,” in
which “the official trade returns of practically every country in the
world are received and collated.” 178 If the parties said in their
177
178

Jones, supra note 174, at 476.
Jones, supra note 174, at 477. The article continues:
Constant touch, by means of correspondence, is maintained with the
government statistical offices of the various countries, and detailed
information of the pulp and paper trade throughout the world, – and
much of it of an invaluable kind – is thus obtained. The mode of
operation followed in this department is for the records to be collected,
converted into Canadian weights and currency, and issued, in the form of
monthly, quarterly, and annual reports, to the various departments
concerned. In this manner close track is kept of the world’s markets,
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contract that they would agree to a price that reflected the prevailing
market price, that could have led to distracting and costly
disagreements over what exactly this price was. At least the
Canadian price would be, as the dissent put it, “definite,” as well as,
apparently, fairly accurate and up to date. 179
The more plausible explanation for pegging the maximum to
the Canadian Export Paper Company price, however, is that the
parties anticipated that the Canadian Export Paper Company price
would not exactly track the “market” price, but would potentially be
lower, at least for U.S.-based manufacturers. Otherwise, why agree
to a price maximum? In fact, prices by Canadian manufacturers were
apparently often lower than prices of U.S. manufacturers because of
the Canadian companies’ greater access to cheaper wood and water
power. 180 In addition, Sun Printing argued in its brief that it would
sources of supply and trade possibilities.
Jones, supra note 174, at 477. Although this description of statistical record-keeping in a
leading trade journal is unsurprisingly positive, another perspective was that this information
facilitated anticompetitive collusion. See Senate 1920 Report, supra note 137, at 2-3 (stating
that “the companies gathered general statistics on the amount of paper consumed by their
different customers so as to estimate what quantity of paper would produce the most
favorable market conditions.”).
179 Further evidence of the Canadian Export Paper Company’s importance in the market
can be found in the fact that in February 1919 (several months before the contract), the
accounting firm Perley Morse published a tract entitled Cost Keeping for Newsprint Paper
Mills, which proposed a uniform cost accounting system for integrated newsprint
manufacturers. See Perley Morse & Co., Cost Keeping for Newsprint Paper Mills (1919).
The tract was commissioned by an entity called the Committee on Uniform Cost Keeping, of
which Canadian mills associated with the Canadian Export Pricing Company were members
and of which one E.S. Coleman, representing those mills, was the co-chair. The proposed
system was submitted to the Federal Trade Commission, which in a letter stated that it
generally approved of the approach, but cautioned that it had not had sufficient time “to
make a thorough study of this matter such as constructive criticism would require.” Id. at 5.
180 One contemporary trade article listed the advantages held by the companies
represented by the Canadian Export Paper Company:
Prominent among these [advantageous resources] are great water powers
which guarantee a continuity of service at a reasonable rate, stable in
flow, with large drainage areas, and with high heads capable of cheap
development. Labor is abundant and satisfactory in quality. The
tidewater locations are easy of access to the great markets of the world.
The big consuming markets are accessible. And, finally, there is the
supreme advantage of efficient and expert management.
Jones, supra note 174, at 477. Even if one takes some of these boasts with a grain of salt,
there is probably at least some truth to them. See also FTC 1917 Report, supra note 125, at
114 (stating that the cost of producing newsprint in Canada “is from $4 to $5 [per ton,
corresponding to $.20 per 100 pounds] less than in this country”); Senate Subcommittee
Hearings, supra note 127, at 403 (testimony of Mr. Gefeall of the Chicago Daily News that
the Canadian Export Paper Company did not sell at the highest price it could get “because
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have in fact contracted with the Canadian Export Paper Company if
Remington had not been willing to match its (lower) price. That
suggests the price maximum was a variation on a “most favored
nation” clause. Moreover, the fact that the contract stipulated that the
price maximum was based not just on any old Canadian Export Paper
Company price but the price charged to the “large consumers,” who
were the publishers like Sun Printing most likely to get price
discounts because of the large volume they purchased, further
supports the proposition that the Canadian Export Paper Company
price was, if anything, likely to be lower than the “market” price. 181
But if the parties anticipated that the Canadian Export Paper
Company price would be lower than the market price, then why state
the price as a maximum rather than simply say that the price will be
the Canadian Export Paper Company price? One possibility might be
that Remington might have been reluctant to agree to expressly tie
the contract price to that of the Canadian Export Paper Company for
fear of arousing the antitrust regulators. 182 More likely, the buyer
was protecting against the (possibly remote) possibility that the
Canadian Export Paper Company price could rise above the market
price and the seller was willing to give the buyer protection against
that contingency.
Thus, the price maximum was most likely designed as a form
of partial price protection for Sun Publishing, which feared higher
market prices over the duration of the contract and sought to reduce
this risk to some degree. Remington might have been willing to give
Sun Publishing this protection for several reasons. First, Remington
might have been anxious to obtain and lock in Sun Printing’s
significant business for 1920, and offering some price protection was
a way to do so. Remington might have been particularly interested in
shoring up customers for 1920 early because it had been in
negotiations to merge with the St. Regis Paper Company, the number
twelve U.S. producer in 1916. Negotiations concerning this merger,
the price of domestic paper, American mills, was higher than that”).
181 The Canadian Export Paper Company sold not only to the large dailies but also to
jobbers who resold to smaller newspapers. FTC 1917 Report, supra note 125, at 42.
182 This concern would not have been entirely speculative. Several months after
Remington abandoned the contract in December 1919, the U.S. House of Representatives
passed a resolution asking the Secretary of Commerce to furnish information concerning,
among other things, “whether any class of newspapers have secured by contract or otherwise
any undue preference or advantage over other classes of newspapers in the supply of print
paper; and such information.” H.R. RES. 489, supra note 176, at 276.
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which would make Remington the third largest newsprint
manufacturer in the U.S., were publicized on August 28, 1919, 183 and
were probably known by Sun Printing at the time the contract was
entered into. Demonstrating a guaranteed stable of important
customers might have made the deal more attractive and likely to be
agreed to by St. Regis. On the other side, the proposed merger deal
might have made Sun Printing more apprehensive that Remington
would be more likely to demand exorbitant prices post-merger
because of its enhanced market power.
Second, Remington might have thought it was not making
much of a concession to Sun Printing because Remington might have
predicted that the Canadian Export Paper Company price was not
likely to deviate too much from the prevailing market price. 184 The
anticompetitive version of this story would be that Remington
anticipated a market more tightly controlled by manufacturers in the
upcoming year and that the Canadian Export Paper Company, given
its size and market position in Canada, would be a price leader and
thus not likely to undercut prevailing market prices. 185 An alternative
reason Remington might not have been too concerned about the price
maximum was that Sun Printing agreed to pay Remington any
difference in freight rates between the rates Sun Printing would have
to pay to ship the paper from Remington’s mill and the rates it would
have to pay to ship the paper from the Canadian Export Paper
Company mills. So perhaps Remington gave with one hand and took
back with the other. 186 The freight rate differential might not have
been so great, however. In 1916, freight rates from mills in eastern
183

Watertown Paper Mills Plan Merger, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1919, at 18.
The subsequent Senate Report provides some support for the theory that the price
maximum did not result from Sun Printing’s bargaining power or superior market position.
See Senate 1920 Report, supra note 137, at 5 (“Even the large newsprint publishers are at the
mercy of the manufacturers. It is a special favor to-day for any manufacturer to contract at
any price to furnish newsprint paper to any publisher.”).
185 Victor Lawson and J.A. Gefaell, Declare Canadians Rule Paper Market, N.Y. TIMES,
May 13, 1920, at 26. That article reported that the sales manager of the Interstate Pulp and
Paper Company testified before Congress that “[a] combination of Canadian manufacturers
practically controls the print paper market through the Canadian Export Paper Company”
and that “the prices it set were followed by other manufacturers.” In addition, the publisher
of the Chicago Daily News testified that “his experience had been that the Canadian
company prevented competition.”
186 See FTC 1917 Report, supra note 125, at 48 (“The chief cause of the variation in prices
between different sections of the country is the wide range in freight rates due to the
localization of the news-print industry in the spruce timber regions of northern United States
and in Canada.”).
184
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states to New York City averaged $.14 per 100 pounds ($2.80 per
ton), 187 whereas freight rates from Canadian provinces to various
states in the U.S. ranged from $.10 to $.20 per 100 pounds ($2 to $4
per ton). 188 The New York Times reported paying $.23 per 100
pounds ($4.60 per ton) for freight on its contracts with the Canadian
Export Paper Company in 1920. 189 And Remington’s main mills
were located in Norfolk and Raymondtown, New York (northeast of
its headquarters in Watertown), near the Canadian border and only
about 100 miles from Montreal, the headquarters of the Canadian
Export Paper Company. The freight rate provision may have just
been a hedge against any attempt by the Canadian Export Paper
Company to charge its customers lower base prices but then get the
money back by charging them more for shipping.
3. The Price Duration Term
That leaves the price duration term. Why might the parties
have left that open? The first thing to note is that to the extent that
the parties expected prices to rise in 1920, the buyer would generally
favor a longer price term and the seller would generally favor a
shorter price term – that is, a price term with more frequent price
adjustments – to align more closely with rising market prices. The
standard price duration term in the industry was three months
(quarterly) and that was reflected in the price term for the first four
months of the contract, as discussed above. Why not just agree to a
quarterly price duration term? Perhaps this was another concession
that Remington extracted from Sun Printing in exchange for the price
maximum. Remington perhaps wanted to reserve the possibility of
more frequent (e.g. monthly or bi-monthly) price adjustments.
But it’s not clear that Remington would actually benefit from
this possibility. It would depend on the duration of the Canadian
Export Paper Company contracts with its large customers. If the
Canadian Export Paper Company followed the three-month price
187 FTC 1917 Report, supra note 125, at 49. For the 1917 contracts, freight rates in the
northeast averaged around $.15. FTC 1917 Report, supra note 125, at 57.
188 FTC 1917 Report, supra note 125, at 50. It’s not clear whether the parties meant that
the applicable freight rate for the Canadian Export Paper Company would be the freight rates
it charged its largest customers, or the freight rates it would charge for shipping paper to
New York City, where Sun was located.
189 Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 22-23 (testimony of George
McAneny, Executive Manager of the New York Times).
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term that was the industry norm at the time, then that price would be
fixed for three months. Suppose in January 1920 that the Canadian
Export Paper Company agreed to three-month price terms with its
large customers and set the contract price at $4.50 per 100 pounds.
That price would prevail for January, February, and March. Even if
spot market or contract prices rose during that period, if Remington
demanded a monthly reset of prices, the contract price under the
maximum price term would still be $4.50 each month until the next
reset of the Canadian Export Paper Company contract prices in April
1920. So, insisting on a monthly price would not do Remington any
good. That suggests the open price duration term, like the price
maximum term, was actually for the benefit of Sun Printing, the
buyer. If the parties were to deviate from the three-month price
duration norm, it would likely be to lengthen the price duration term,
something Remington would probably not agree to unless both
parties thought prices were likely to remain stable for longer than
three months.
Alternatively, it is possible that the parties did not know what
price duration term the Canadian Export Paper Company would use
in 1920 and were just waiting to see what it did. The dissent suggests
this possibility by saying the price duration from the Canadian Export
Paper Company contract could be used to fill the price duration gap.
The natural question, however, is why the parties did not simply say
that. They could have said that the price would be no greater, and
price duration no shorter, than those in the Canadian Export Paper
Company contracts. But it is possible the parties thought they had
effectively said that, and Sun Printing did not realize that the failure
to spell out the duration more explicitly would be fatal to
enforcement of the contract. As Cardozo himself perceptively noted,
there was a close connection between price and price duration. But
Cardozo did not follow the implication of this insight to its
reasonable conclusion. To say that the price was to be no higher than
the Canadian Export Paper Company’s “contract price” was arguably
a shorthand. It was not necessary to reference the price duration
because, of course, the price duration could not be any shorter than
that reflected in the Canadian company’s contracts once the parties
settled on the Canadian price maximum.
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C. Why did Remington Breach the Contract in 1920?
As Cardozo notes in his opinion, and as discussed above,
market prices indeed rose during 1920. Although that would
generally motivate a seller to avoid its contract, that would be true
only if the contract price were fixed. But the contract price was to be
renegotiated in December 1919. So, the key must be the Canadian
Export Paper Company contract price, which was the crucial feature
of the Sun Printing-Remington contract. 190 What was that price? It
turns out that the Canadian Export Paper Company contract price was
$4.50 per 100 pounds, 191 a 12.5% increase over the Sun PrintingRemington contract price for the last quarter, and probably not too far
out of whack from the going contract prices. 192 What is interesting,
however, is what happened to the price duration term. For its
contracts beginning in January 1920, the Canadian Export Paper
Company, somewhat surprisingly increased its contract price duration
term from three months (quarterly) in 1919, to six months. 193
190 The publisher of the New York Sun, Frank A. Munsey, testified before Congress in
May 1920 that all the other manufacturers other than Remington had kept their contracts
with him. Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 130. That suggests that what
led to the breach was the unique aspects of the contract with Remington.
191 Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 432; see also Senate Subcommittee
Hearings, supra note 127, at 21 (testimony of George McAneny, Executive Manager of the
New York Times, that it had a contract with the Canadian Export Paper Company at 4 ½
cents per pound, or $4.50 per 100 pounds); Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127,
at 118 (testimony of Fleming Newbold, Business Manager of the Washington, D.C. Evening
Star, that he made a contract with the Canadian Export Paper Company in December 1919 at
4 ½ cents per pound, or $4.50 per 100 pounds).
192 The publisher of the New York Sun, Frank A. Munsey, testified that he was able to get
a 4 ½ contract price for the first quarter of 1920, suggesting that the Canadian Export Paper
Company contract price tracked the market price at that time, although it could be that he
was simply referencing the contract with Remington that he thought he had. Senate
Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 141. The subsequent Senate Report found that
contract prices for the large metropolitan daily publishers during the first quarter ranged
from 3 cents to 5 cents per pound ($3 to $5 per 100 pounds). See Senate 1920 Report, supra
note 137, at 4. But see Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 21 (testimony of
George McAneny, Executive Manager of the New York Times, that at the beginning of 1920
it had contracts with one mill for 6.75 cents per pound and one contract with a price
changing monthly that ran from 7 ½ cents to 8 ¼ cents per pound).
193 Compare Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 434 with Senate
Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 432; see also Senate Subcommittee Hearings,
supra note 127, at 21-22 (testimony of George McAneny, Executive Manager of the New
York Times, discussing contracts with the Canadian Export Paper Company, which in 1919
had quarterly adjustments, and in 1920, which had an adjustment after six months); Senate
Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 116 (testimony of Fleming Newbold, Business
Manager of the Washington, D.C. Evening Star, that it had a contract at 4 ½ cents with the
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Perhaps to compensate for the apparent generosity to the
buyer of that price duration term, given the expected increase in
prices during 1920, the Canadian contract also changed one other
feature of its contract. The 1919 contract had stated that the price for
the first three months was $3.65 per 100 pounds. It then had
provided: “[t]he price for the second three months, and for each
succeeding three-month period, shall be such as the parties shall
mutually agree, and in case of failure to so agree, this contract shall
terminate at the end of any three-month period for which price has
been so agreed upon.” 194 In the 1920 contract, however, the “price
for the second six months [is] to be fixed exclusively by the seller on
or before June 1, 1920.” 195 That is, the contract changed from one
requiring mutual agreement at the time of the price reset, to one
giving the seller unilateral discretion to reset the price.
Thus, although this information does not provide a conclusive
reason as to why Remington breached, it does suggest why
Remington would have been unhappy. The Canadian Export Paper
Co. extended its contract duration term during a time of rapidly rising
market prices. Although I have not been able to determine exactly
how much Remington gained from avoiding the contract or how
much Sun Printing lost, at the very least, Remington was probably
not expecting the Canadian Company’s change in business
practices. 196
Canadian Export Paper Company until July 1, 1920 and after that time the price was “subject
to change by the manufacturer”).
194 Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 435.
195 Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 432. A letter from G.F. Steele,
General Manager of the Canadian Export Paper Company, to Victor F. Lawson, Publisher of
the Chicago Daily News, dated April 26, 1920, stated that Steele expected that on July 1,
1920, he expected to impose “quite a material advance in price.” Senate Subcommittee
Hearings, supra note 127, at 432; see also Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at
21 (New York Times contract with Canadian Export Paper Company also had a price for the
first six months, after which the company had “the right to change their figures to all their
customers on the 1st of July”). Because the Senate Hearings in which this letter was
presented occurred in May 1920, they do not reveal how big the price increase was.
196 The testimony of Frank A. Munsey, the publisher of the Sun, at Senate Subcommittee
Hearings on the Newsprint Paper Industry on May 1, 1920 provides some insight, but
because the focus of the inquiry was elsewhere, the testimony is ambiguous and
inconclusive. First, Munsey stated that he was currently paying 5 cents per pound
(corresponding to $5 per 100 pounds or $100 per ton) for contract newsprint in the second
quarter of 1920 after paying 4 ½ cents in the first quarter (corresponding to $4.50 per 100
pounds, the Canadian Export Paper Company contract price). Senate Subcommittee
Hearings, supra note 127, at 141. If that was the case, then given the Canadian Export Paper
Company’s price of 4 ½ cents per pound (corresponding to $4.50 per 100 pounds and $90
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CARDOZO’S ANALYSIS REVISITED

Now that we have some sense of what was going on at the
time Sun Printing and Remington made their contract, we can return
to Cardozo’s opinion to reconsider his analysis in light of these facts.
A. The Canadian Export Paper Company Contract and
the Materiality of the Open Price Duration Term
For a contract to be indefinite, the missing term or terms must
be material. Cardozo’s first argument is that the open price duration
term was material, even if the buyer agreed to pay the maximum
Canadian Export Paper Company price. Cardozo, following the
suggestion of Remington’s counsel, leads us to believe the price
duration term was material in part by implying that the Canadian
Export Paper Company price was a constantly fluctuating price, or at
least that the duration of the Canadian Export Paper Company price
per ton), the damages on the Remington contract for the first three months of 1920 would
have been 0, and in the second quarter of 1920, during which 3000 tons were to have been
delivered, would have been only $30,000. If those prices had prevailed during the third and
fourth quarters, that would result in only $90,000 in damages, far less than the $910,000 of
“general” damages alleged by Sun Printing. It is, of course, possible that the market prices
continued to rise during the third and fourth quarters of 1920 to such an extent (Sun Printing
alleged that the prices rose to as much as $11.75 per 100 pounds) that the $910,000 figure
alleged by Sun Printing would make sense, but that would only be the case if the Canadian
Export Paper Company kept its contract price at $4.50 per 100 pounds for the second half of
1920, which seems very unlikely. If the Canadian price stayed at $4.50 per 100 pounds, and
the market price was $11.75, then Sun Printing’s damages for the last six months of 1920
would be $870,000 [($11.75-$4.50) x 20 x 6000].
The 1920 contract price of $5 per 100 pounds stated by Munsey is also significantly
less than other large papers were reporting paying on their contracts during 1920. See
Declare Canadians Rule Paper Market, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1920. I am not sure how to
reconcile the discrepancy. Perhaps Munsey was not able to get contracts for all of the
newsprint he was supposed to get from Remington, or was not able to get them for the first
quarter of 1920. He does mention having to go into the spot market, where he had to pay as
much as 12 cents per pound ($12 per 100 pounds), but then said that he was no longer
buying in the spot market as of May 1, 1920. Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note
127, at 141. Later in his testimony, he said that between contract and spot purchases, his
average price for newsprint was 6 cents per pound. Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra
note 127, at 146. Finally, Munsey added that “with the situation that developed and the
welshing on the part of the Remington Paper Co., and the way that things have turned out, if
I had not bought the New York Herald with its paper contract I should have been compelled
to stop either the morning or the evening Sun. I could not have got the paper.” Senate
Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 146. I do not know whether Munsey actually
bought the Herald as an act of mitigation or whether he had already purchased it and just
lucked out in inheriting its contracts, which presumably left the Herald with more newsprint
than it needed.
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would be shorter than the price duration term that Sun Printing and
Remington were likely to agree on. Hence, Cardozo states that the
parties “did not understand that, if during the term so established the
price charged by the Canadian Export Paper Company was changed,
the price payable to the seller would fluctuate accordingly.” 197
But Cardozo’s suggestion ignores the fact that the parties in
their contract referenced the Canadian Export Paper Company
contract price, not a spot market price. If the Canadian Export Paper
Company sold to the “large customers” under contracts rather than on
the spot market, which it did, 198 the price it charged would last for the
duration of the price term of those contracts, and would change only
when the contract price with the large customers was reset. Thus, as
noted in the previous section, so long as Sun Printing was willing to
pay the Canadian Export Paper Company price, the price duration
term of the Sun Printing-Remington contract would be immaterial at
the time of the initial price reset unless one or both parties sought a
price duration term longer than the contract price duration term of the
Canadian Export Paper Company contracts. Again, as noted in the
last section, the Canadian Export Paper Company contract price for
January 1920 was $4.50 per 100 pounds of newsprint and that price
term lasted for six months. Because Sun Printing agreed to pay this
price, there would have been no point in the parties negotiating a
price duration term less than six months, unless Sun Printing for
some reason expected not to want to continue paying the Canadian
maximum price for the whole six months, which was not likely in a
rising market. And although Remington would obviously have
objected to a price duration term longer than six months, there is no
evidence that Sun Printing sought that.
If this point is correct, then not only did the Canadian Export
Paper Company contract price act as a price maximum, but the
Canadian Export Paper Company contract duration simultaneously
acted as a price duration minimum. Cardozo missed this point.
Instead, he found no language in the contract to support the argument
that “there was no need of an agreement as to time unless the price to

197

Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 471.
See testimony of Mr. McAneny, Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 38
(“You take the big ones, the International, the Great Northern, the Canadian Export, those
three groups comprise the great majority of tonnage. I do not think any of them sell except
at their contract price. They fix one price for every customer and they do not depart from
that.”).
198
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be paid was lower than the maximum.” 199 Contrary to Cardozo’s
reasoning, the language and structure of the contract do support the
argument. If, as Cardozo surmised, Sun Printing’s exercising the
“option” to expressly agree to pay the maximum price would solve
the indefiniteness problem caused by the open price term, then
exercising the same option to impliedly agree to the minimum
duration in the Canadian contract, which stated that maximum price,
should have solved any indefiniteness problem with the open price
duration term. 200
B. The Option Theory, Market Prices, and the Buyer’s
Ability to Take Advantage of the Seller
The heart of Cardozo’s argument is that filling the price
duration term with one-month periods would give the buyer a dozen
options, to which the seller would not plausibly have agreed because
the seller would “never knew where it stood” and would be placed “at
the mercy of the buyer.” 201 Cardozo uses two hypothetical examples
to prove his points: a rising Canadian Export Paper Company price,
and a declining market price. To unpack and critique Cardozo’s
reasoning, let us take as given for the moment Cardozo’s assumption
(wrong though it was) that the filled-in price duration would be one
month. First, what does Cardozo mean by the buyer having an
“option?” At the very least, he means that the buyer did not have to
accept the Canadian maximum price. But Cardozo also implies that
having an option meant that the buyer could, if it chose, simply
abandon the contract without consequence if it did not want to pay
the Canadian maximum price. That seems to be the sense in which
Cardozo believes the seller would be disadvantaged by the option
interpretation. Cardozo’s argument raises several further questions:
When would the buyer not want to accept the maximum price? How
likely were these conditions to arise? If these conditions did arise,
did the parties really expect or intend that the buyer could simply
walk away from the contract? And even if the buyer did walk away
or threaten to do so, would that place the seller at the buyer’s mercy?
The primary reason the buyer would fail to choose the
199

Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 471.
It is perhaps worth pointing out that the price duration term also had a maximum–one
year–the amount of time left on the contract. Id. at 470.
201 Id. at 471.
200
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Canadian Export Paper Company contract price would be if the
“market” price fell below the Canadian company’s contract price.
The key, therefore, was the relationship between the Canadian price
and the market price, not whether those prices were rising or falling.
Yet Cardozo writes as if an increase in the Canadian Export Paper
Company price alone might lead Sun Printing to decline to exercise
its “option” to continue paying it. It is, of course, true that buyers
prefer to pay lower prices than higher prices. But even if the
Canadian Export Paper Company price rose, so long as market prices
also rose and the Canadian Export Paper Company price remained
below the market price, which is what happened, Sun Printing would
still have an incentive to choose the Canadian Export Paper Company
price throughout the term of the contract. Sun Printing would not do
better by abandoning the contract and either entering into a substitute
contract or going into the spot market to buy newsprint. 202 Similarly,
under Cardozo’s second hypothetical example, falling market prices
would not lead Sun Printing to abandon the contract so long as the
Canadian price also fell and remained at or below market prices.
Next, the analysis in the last section suggests that the parties
anticipated that the Canadian Export Paper Company contract price
was likely to remain lower, or at least not rise above, the prevailing
market price offered to the large newsprint publishers. In fact, that
was the whole point of using the Canadian Export Paper Company
price as a maximum. Thus, there was no reason to anticipate that the
buyer would want to exit the contract, and that is in fact what
happened. The Canadian Export Paper Company contract price
remained below the market price and the buyer expressed its
willingness to pay the Canadian company’s price for the remaining
twelve months of the contract. Of course, it is possible that the
Canadian price could have risen above the market price. For
example, the United States could have suddenly and unexpectedly
increased tariffs on Canadian newsprint. Alternatively, perhaps Sun
Printing would have been able to find some newsprint manufacturer
with sufficient capacity and a willingness to undercut the Canadian

202

Even if the Canadian Export Paper Company contract price rose above the market
price for long-term contracts, it is unlikely that it would have risen above the spot market
price, which was generally higher at the time than contract prices. See FTC 1917 Report,
supra note 125, at 49. (“Contract purchases ordinarily average a lower price than market
purchases, and transactions involving large quantities a lower price than those involving
small quantities.”).
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Export Paper Company contract price. But the likelihood of those
scenarios was probably pretty small at the time Sun Printing and
Remington negotiated the contract.
Suppose, however, that for some reason the Canadian Export
Paper Company contract price had risen above the market price.
Suppose, for example, that the Canadian company raised its contract
price in July 1920 (the second six-month period) to an above-market
price to make up for its low price for the first six months (recall that
contract with its buyers allowed it to unilaterally set the price after six
months). Would Sun Printing have just walked away from the
contract in that case at the time of price renegotiation? Most likely
not. Sun Printing would probably have sought to renegotiate the
price to the lower market price, as permitted by the contract.
Remington would likely have accepted that price, or something close
to it, since Remington would not have done much better selling to a
different buyer if Sun Printing walked away from the contract
negotiations. If there were costs involved in the buyer switching
suppliers mid-year, or foregone benefits in losing a long-term
relationship with the seller, perhaps the price would be negotiated
somewhere between the market price and the Canadian price.
It is true that the parties might not reach a deal through either
stubborn bargaining positions or honest disagreement about what
counted as the market price. Probably, however, they would have
agreed, and that is what the parties would have expected to happen at
the time they made the contract. From that conclusion to the
conclusion that the parties “intended” this result is not a big leap; in
fact, it is the leap that UCC § 2-305 takes in allowing courts to fill in
open price terms with a “reasonable” (i.e. market) price. In any case,
the likelihood of the buyer walking away from the contract seems
very small. Thus, viewing the contract as an “option” in the
traditional sense seems misleading.
In light of the foregoing analysis, in what possible sense could
enforcing the contract have placed Remington at Sun Printing’s
mercy? As discussed above, Remington was likely unhappy with the
contract because the market price rose while the Canadian Export
Paper Company contract price was fixed for six months, but that
problem cannot be what Cardozo had in mind. Remington’s
unhappiness was a consequence of the express price maximum to
which Remington had agreed, and the resulting risk associated with
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agreeing to that maximum. 203 The same would have been true if both
the Canadian Export Paper Company contract price and the market
price had fallen, but the relationship between the two remained the
same (Canadian contract price below market price). Perhaps if both
prices dropped, but the Canadian Export Paper Company price fell
below Remington’s costs of production, Remington would have a
legitimate ground for complaint, but that possibility seems remote
and could perhaps have been dealt with by allowing excuse for the
seller. If, on the other hand, the Canadian Export Paper Company
price had risen above the market price and Sun Printing for whatever
reason had abandoned the contract, Remington would have been no
worse off than if the contract had not been made. It would likely
have been able to find another buyer willing to pay the thenprevailing market price. Thus, although Remington was certainly
disadvantaged by the way things turned out, it is hard to see how it
was, or could have been, placed at Sun Printing’s mercy. If
Remington was at the mercy of anything, it was the contract to which
Remington voluntarily agreed.
C. Filling in the Price Duration Term
Cardozo’s third main argument is that there was no
reasonable way for the court to fill in the missing price duration term.
Specifically, Cardozo objected to reading into the contract a monthly
price duration term. In Cardozo’s view, since the contract language
spoke of an agreement about price duration rather than a monthly
term, implying a term based on trade usage would “make the contract
over.” 204 Moreover, Cardozo emphasized that the buyer had not
allowed the seller to choose a price duration, but instead had insisted
on a monthly duration, possibly for self-serving reasons. None of
these points is convincing.

203 Remington could perhaps have argued that because the Canadian Export Paper
Company acted in an unexpected way in extending its contract term to six months,
Remington should have been excused from the contract on the ground of mutual mistake. It
is unlikely that claim would have succeeded at the time, or even today. The claim resembles
the one that prevailed (many years after Sun Printing) in the famous Alcoa case (involving a
price index designed by Alan Greenspan that did not perform as the parties anticipated),
though that case has been subject to extensive criticism (though I happen to agree with the
Alcoa court’s result) and has not generally been followed. see Aluminum Co. of Am. v.
Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 55 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
204 Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 471.
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Cardozo’s focus on monthly pricing (the “dozen options”
theory) as the most likely gap-filler is understandable. The duration
of the initial price in the contract was one month. The contract had
monthly delivery and payment terms, which (along with the fifteenday advance notice requirement) makes it unlikely the parties
contemplated a price duration less than one month. The dissent
mentioned one month as one of its possible gap-filling durations,205
and Sun Printing made monthly demands to Remington for delivery
after Remington declared it would no longer perform.
Nevertheless, a quarterly price term duration would have been
the more plausible gap-filler. As noted above, the contract language
provided two important reference points on price duration. It
structured the price for the first four months consistently with
quarterly pricing. The fact that the initial price was only one month
was likely a consequence of the fact that it was the last month of the
third quarter of 1919. Moreover, as Judge Crane pointed out in his
dissent, the contract specifically referenced the contract price of the
Canadian Export Paper Company, which (unbeknownst to Judge
Crane) had most recently used quarterly pricing in its contracts.206
Moreover, quarterly pricing was the standard price duration term for
year-long contracts in the newsprint industry. 207 The fact that on
remand Sun Printing argued for quarterly pricing also supports this
conclusion. Whether to imply a quarterly price duration gap-filler
would have been an issue if the Canadian Export Paper Company had
reduced its contract price duration to, say, one month in 1920 and
Sun Printing insisted on quarterly pricing. As it turned out, however,
the Canadian Export Paper Company contract price duration was six
months (as already noted), so implying a quarterly price duration
term for the first quarter of 1920 would not have made sense. It is
puzzling that Sun Printing did not point this out and argue for sixmonth pricing periods.
Finally, the fact that Sun Printing made monthly demands
after Remington declined to perform is most likely a result of the fact
that the deliveries were to be made monthly, not an assertion of the

205

Id. at 472.
Id.
207 Quarterly pricing was also the standard used in the St. Regis case, which Cardozo had
decided only months before Sun Printing. St. Regis Paper Co. v. Hubbs & Hastings Paper
Co., 138 N.E. 495, 496-97 (N.Y. 1923). Somehow, that fact did not stick in the minds of
either Cardozo or Crane.
206
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price duration term Sun Printing preferred. To the extent that
Cardozo was suggesting that Sun Printing was acting
opportunistically in asserting one-month duration periods, that
suggestion makes no sense. As Cardozo mentions in his opinion and
as the background discussed above shows, prices in the newsprint
market were rising and were expected to continue rising. Under
those circumstances, the buyer would want the longest price duration
possible and the seller would prefer a shorter price duration. If
anything, the one-month price duration period would have been most
favorable to Remington, putting aside the Canadian contract duration.
Moreover, even on remand when Sun Printing could have argued for
a six-month duration term based on the Canadian Export Paper
Company contracts, it argued only for a quarterly price duration term
(though that may have been a meaningless show of generosity given
that a quarterly price duration term would not, for reasons already
explained, have changed the outcome). In any case, Cardozo’s
insinuation of bad behavior by Sun Printing turns out to be more than
a bit ironic. Even under the “cure by concession” view mentioned by
Cardozo and supported by several commentators, Sun Printing
acceded to the price duration term most generous to Remington.
Thus, Cardozo should have enforced the contract.
D. Stability and Certainty
Underlying Cardozo’s analysis in Sun Printing is a larger
jurisprudential point. In Cardozo’s view, declining to enforce the
contract would promote “stability and certainty.” 208 But how,
exactly? There are two possibilities: more certain law, and more
certain contracts.
Uncertainty in contract law can certainly create uncertainty
for businesses subject to that law. They may respond to that
uncertainty by writing more detailed contract terms to overcome it,
by attempting to exploit it to their advantage and the disadvantage of
their contracting partners, or at the extreme by foregoing contracts.
In my view, however, Cardozo’s opinion does not reduce uncertainty
in contract law. Cardozo does repeat the contract law “rule” that
agreements to agree are not enforceable (albeit not until about
halfway through his analysis), but how does his opinion clarify

208
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contracting parties’ understanding of that rule? Cardozo himself
suggests that he might have been willing to enforce the contract,
despite its “agreement to agree” language, if the parties had left
open only the price term, so Cardozo apparently believes that
some agreements to agree are enforceable. Which ones? Perhaps
Cardozo’s gloss on the “rule” is that one open material term is not
fatal but two or more are. Or that if the parties leave out the price
term and one other material term, the contract is indefinite. Or
perhaps the rule is limited to price and a term closely connected to
price. Or perhaps the rule is limited to situations in which enforcing
the contract would enable one party to place the other at its mercy. It
is hard to know.
Cardozo advises that courts may not “revise” contracts, but
may “construe” them. 209 How does one tell the difference? Cardozo
suggests a textualist approach that refuses to make the parties
“conform to the practice and beliefs of others” 210 in the face of a
contract that does just that in the form of the price maximum set
according to the contract price of the Canadian Export Paper
Company. Moreover, Cardozo seems to have been willing to
consider contextual evidence if Sun Printing had provided it,
especially if the evidence would reduce Cardozo’s concern that
enforcing the contract would permit the buyer to take unfair
advantage of the seller. Thus, Cardozo does not provide much clarity
or certainty on this question either.
Cardozo’s bigger concern is that the parties themselves need
to write more certain contracts, so that courts can “construe” rather
than “revise” them. He suggests that the parties “with little change of
language” could (and therefore should) have written a more certain
contract. The issue, however, is not whether the parties could have
written a more complete contract but why they did not and whether it
would have been efficient to do so. If the parties thought it not worth
the time and trouble to spell out a precise price duration term, or if
they thought they actually did spell it out in by referencing the
Canadian Export Paper Company’s contract price, then why should
the court not respect that decision? Renegotiated price terms were
the norm in newsprint contracts at the time. Cardozo’s opinion
arguably increased uncertainty in the industry by making the

209
210

Id.
Id.
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enforceability of all those contracts, which no one before had any
reason to doubt, an open question. Moreover, Cardozo’s question
could be turned around. “With little change of language,” the parties
could have stated that if they did not reach agreement on the price or
price duration terms, the contract would terminate. 211 That is
precisely what the Canadian Export Paper Company did in its 1919
contracts and also what the St. Regis company did in the contract that
Cardozo and his colleagues had addressed only months before the
Sun Printing case. 212
Cardozo’s view may be that it does not matter whether the
parties “intended” to have the court enforce the contract if they could
not reach agreement, because the “indefiniteness” rule is really about
regulating contracting behavior regardless of their intentions.213
But Cardozo’s opinion on this point, as on the others, is highly
ambiguous. Even if one accepts that Cardozo is arguing for a
regulatory purpose for the rule, it’s not clear that such a purpose
argues for his result. If the parties in the industry did not respond by
making their contracts more certain, as Macaulay’s article suggests
happened, then what exactly did the regulatory approach accomplish,
other than to reduce the benefits of the contracting device? An
ongoing debate rages among contract law theorists about whether the
indefiniteness rule is more about fulfilling the parties’ intentions or
about regulating contracting behavior, or whether those two
approaches are even really distinct. Cardozo’s opinion does nothing
to clarify this debate, however.
E. Antitrust Concerns
Finally, suppose there was something to the concerns about
211 Cf. VICTOR GOLDBERG, Reading Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon With Help From
The Kewpie Dolls, in FRAMING CONTRACT LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (Harvard
University Press 2006). Another contract around the same time had an explicit best efforts
provision. Goldberg argues from that fact that Cardozo should not have implied one in
Wood.
212 In St. Regis Paper Co., recall that Cardozo cited this case in his opinion but did not
address the fact that the contract in that case had an express termination clause. St. Regis
Paper Co., 138 N.E. at 496.
213 See, e.g., Geis, supra note 9, at 1716-18 (suggesting that courts should fill in gaps in
contracts only when the parties have made “efficient upfront investments in contractual
specificity” to discourage parties from deliberately leaving gaps to take advantage of an
“embedded option” – the possibility that a court might fill in the gap with a term favorable to
one side – and to “prevent parties from externalizing contracting costs to the courts”).
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antitrust violations in the paper industry and consider the contract
from that perspective. One plausible explanation for the longer price
duration term in the Canadian Export Paper Company contract is that
the Canadian Export Paper Company, for some reason, decided not to
go along with the collusive prices in the paper industry as much as
Remington expected it to. In modern parlance, the Canadian Export
Paper Company may have been “cheating” on the cartel. It turned
out to be a price cutter, not a price leader. Another related possibility
is that market prices were not as high in January 1920 as the
newsprint manufacturers wanted, and Remington might have
(secretly) agreed with other manufacturers to reduce its output and
abandoned the Sun Printing contract because the large quantity in that
contract exceeded Remington’s production “quota.” Either of these
possibilities makes Remington’s decision to abandon the contract
troubling not only from a contract perspective, but from an antitrust
perspective as well (though of course antitrust concerns are typically
not a factor in contract law cases). On the other hand, if Remington
breached simply to sell the full quantity on the spot market (a fact on
which I have no evidence, and which seems unlikely), Remington’s
breach could have helped alleviate Congress’s concern with the
“shortage” of newsprint available to the smaller publishers at the
time.
CONCLUSION
I put myself in the camp that finds Cardozo’s Sun Printing
opinion disappointing and inconsistent with a number of his other
contract law opinions. He justified failure to enforce a contract that
even he conceded involved an actual opportunistic attempt by the
seller to escape an assumed risk by impugning imagined
opportunistic behavior by the buyer. 214 He railed against contract
revision and imposed terms when, as I believe both the textual and
the contextual evidence shows, there was a plausible and sensible
way to resolve the indefiniteness consistent with the express and
implied intentions of the parties. 215 It is ironic that Cardozo, the

214 By contrast, as Professor Kaufman writes, “[a]cting with honor, fulfilling a duty,
accepting responsibility, and keeping promises were important themes in Cardozo’s equity,
torts, and contracts opinions.” KAUFMAN, supra note 86, at 359.
215 By contrast, in his other contract opinions, Cardozo proceeded from the “need to bring
common law doctrine into line with evolving social or economic conditions,” KAUFMAN,
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judge who preferred writing opinions that avoided sweeping
statements of rules and preserved “options for the future,” 216 was so
unforgiving in this case of contracting parties reasonably trying to do
the same thing. It is equally ironic that he so fervently believed that
his legally ambiguous and factually mistaken opinion would
encourage certainty in business transactions.
Some may be tempted to conclude from Cardozo’s blunder
that if even the great Cardozo cannot understand the business context,
how can we hope other judges to do so (except perhaps for the
Posners and Easterbrooks of the world). Thus, they should not
attempt to do so, but instead should stick to textualism. I do not draw
that conclusion. The contract and surrounding circumstances in this
case were not so hard to understand, and enforcing the contract here
would be consistent with both textualist and contextualist approaches.
If Sun Printing’s lawyers had done a better job explaining these
things (as Llewellyn argued), I am confident Cardozo would have
reached the right result. To me, the lesson of Sun Printing is that
continually striving to improve lawyers’ and courts’ understanding of
contracting conduct and context will lead to better, and more certain,
transactions and law. To paraphrase the great judge, we must revise
our understanding so that courts may better construe.

supra note 86, at 358, and “looked to contemporary commercial practice for enlightenment.”
KAUFMAN, supra note 86, at 359.
216 KAUFMAN, supra note 86, at 358. The passage from which this phrase comes aptly
describes Cardozo’s opinion in Sun Printing. Professor Kaufman wrote that Cardozo:
used the record in each case to produce a sharp vision of the relevant
evidence. In the important cases at the crossroads of doctrine, he usually
sought to write an opinion that dealt with the problem but that decided
no more than necessary. Many Cardozo opinions therefore appear to
have been decided on unique facts, for Cardozo usually did not
emphasize which facts were decisive. . . . They preserved options for the
future.
KAUFMAN, supra note 86, at 358.
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